Firearms Policy and Status

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The online chapters, by Nicholas J. Johnson, David B. Kopel, George A. Mocsary, and E. Gregory Wallace, are available at no charge from either https://www.wklegaledu.com/johnson-firearms-law-2 or from the book’s separate website, firearmsregulation.org. They are:

12. Firearms Policy and Status. Including race, gender, age, disability, and sexual orientation. (This chapter.)
15. In-Depth Explanation of Firearms and Ammunition. The different types of firearms and ammunition. How they work. Intended to be helpful for readers who have little or no prior experience, and to provide a brief overview of more complicated topics.

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Firearms policy debates involve the special concerns of diverse groups in American society. This Chapter examines disparate views about the costs and benefits of firearms in the context of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, marijuana use, military service, and Indian tribes.

Previous chapters have primarily focused on judicial decisions, and legislative and historical material. The content here is different. For the first five groups in the above list, their views are presented through amicus briefs, most of them pro/con briefs from *Heller*. Pedagogically, the briefs are the opportunity to study how policy advocates serve as genuine “friends of the court,” by presenting the Supreme Court with specialized expertise and information. As you will see, there is quite a diversity of writing styles in high-quality amicus briefs. The complete briefs are available at Scotusblog’s *Heller Case Page*. For beginning lawyers with an interest in public affairs, helping with an amicus brief is an excellent and educational pro bono project.

The Chapter is divided into the following Parts:

A. Firearms Policy and the Black Community
B. Gender
C. Age and Physical Disability
D. Sexual Orientation
E. Categories of Prohibited Persons: Mental Illness, Marijuana, and the Military
F. Indian Tribes

Readers interested in past and present arms issues involving lawful or unlawful aliens will find the topic covered extensively in the printed textbook. See Chs. 7.A, 11.D.3.

A. **Firearms Policy and the Black Community**


... In densely populated urban centers like the District of Columbia ... gun violence deprives many residents of an equal opportunity to live, much less succeed.

**SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

... Although the type, use, cultural significance and regulations on the purchase, possession, and use of firearms vary from community to community, handguns—because they are portable and easy to conceal—are uniquely
A. Firearms Policy and the Black Community

lethal instruments, which are involved in the vast majority of firearm violence in America. Handgun violence in the District exacts a particularly high toll on the District’s African-American residents. Multiple municipalities, including the District, have placed significant restrictions on the possession and use of handguns, while permitting the registration of other weapons such as shotguns and rifles.

ARGUMENT . . .

B. THE CLEAR AND ESTABLISHED UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED

2. Abandoning the Clear and Established Understanding of the Second Amendment Unduly Limits the Ability of States and Municipalities Struggling to Address the Problem of Gun Violence, a Problem of Particular Interest to This Nation’s African-American Community

Legislatures enact firearm regulations to reduce crime and save lives threatened by the vexing problem of gun violence. African Americans, especially those who are young, are at a much greater risk of sustaining injuries or dying from gunshot wounds. The number of African-American children and teenagers killed by gunfire since 1979 is more than ten times the number of African-American citizens of all ages lynched throughout American history. See Children’s Defense Fund, Protect Children, Not Guns 1 (2007). . . . Firearm homicide is the leading cause of death for fifteen to thirty-four year-old African Americans. See The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention & Prevention, Leading Causes of Death Reports (1999-2004). Although African Americans comprise only thirteen percent of the United States population, African Americans suffered almost twenty-five percent of all firearm deaths and fifty-three percent of all firearm homicides during the years 1999 to 2004. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Injury Mortality Reports (1999-2004) [hereinafter CDC, Injury Mortality Reports].

With respect to handguns specifically, African Americans again suffer disproportionately. From 1987 to 1992, African-American males were victims of handgun crimes at a rate of 14.2 per 1,000 persons compared to a rate of 3.7 per 1,000 for white males. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Data Brief, Guns and Crime: Handgun Victimization, Firearm Self-Defense, and Firearm Theft (Apr. 1994). . . . During the same period, African-American women were victims of gun violence at a rate nearly four times higher than white women. See id. Overall, African-American males between sixteen and nineteen years old had the highest rate of handgun crime victimization, at a rate of forty per 1,000 persons, or four times that of their white counterparts. See id.

Gun violence also adds significant direct and indirect costs to America’s criminal justice and health care systems, while reducing the nation’s overall life expectancy. See generally Philip Cook & Jens Ludwig, Gun Violence: The Real Costs (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (estimating medical expenditures relating to gun violence, with costs borne by the American public because many gun victims

Although African Americans suffer from a disproportionate share of gun violence nationally, these disparities are significantly larger in the District. In 2004 alone, all but two of the 137 firearm homicide victims in the District were African-American, most of them between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine years old. See CDC, *Injury Mortality Reports (2004)*, supra., African Americans make up approximately sixty percent of the District’s population, but comprise ninety-four percent of its homicide victims. See D.C. Dep’t of Health, Center for Policy, Planning, and Epidemiology, State Center for Health Statistics, Research and Analysis Division, *Homicide in the District of Columbia, 1995-2004*, at 5 (Feb. 1, 2007). Between 1999 and 2004, African Americans in the District died from firearm use at a rate 10.6 times higher than did whites, and suffered from firearm homicide at a rate 16.7 times higher than did whites. See CDC, *Injury Mortality Reports (1999-2004)*, supra. The vast majority of these deaths were the result of handgun violence. See Nat’l Public Radio (NPR), *D.C. Mayor Addresses Blow to Handgun Ban* (Mar. 13, 2007).

Given the prevalence of gun violence in the District and the devastating impact on its residents, the District Council had sound reasons to conclude that its handgun regulations would constitute a wise policy. Ultimately, the overall effectiveness of the District’s handgun prohibition is not relevant to the Court, given the applicable legal standard as discussed above. However, we submit that, although the District’s prohibition may not be a complete solution, especially because the absence of regional regulations permits guns to continue to flow into the District from neighboring jurisdictions, local efforts to reduce the number of handguns on the District’s streets should be considered one piece of a larger solution. Indeed, the enactment of the handgun ban in the District thirty years ago was accompanied by an abrupt decline in firearm-caused homicides in the District, but not elsewhere in the Metropolitan area. . . . These trends underscore the importance of the District’s efforts and certainly do not counsel in favor of an unwarranted jurisprudential break that could drastically limit or foreclose such efforts. This Court’s settled precedents provide the necessary latitude for the District to best protect its citizens by making the policy decision that fewer handguns, not more, promote public health and safety. . . .

3. Abandoning the Clear and Established Understanding of the Second Amendment Would Not Address Racial Discrimination in the Administration of Criminal Justice in General or the Administration of Firearm Restrictions in Particular

Concerns about this nation’s past or present-day problems with racial discrimination do not provide a basis for invalidating the District’s handgun regulations. The solution to discriminatory enforcement of firearm laws is not to reinterpret the Second Amendment to protect an individual right to “keep and
bear Arms” for purely private purposes, but rather to employ, as necessary, this Court’s traditional vehicle for rooting out racial discrimination: the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or, where the actions of the federal government are at issue, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (administration of a criminal law may be “directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive” that the system of enforcement and prosecution amounts to “a practical denial” of equal protection of the laws) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury violates Equal Protection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (invalidating the use of race as a factor in the exercise of peremptory challenges). To the extent the history surrounding the adoption of early gun control laws, or even the Second Amendment itself, is tainted by racial discrimination, see Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 309 (1998) (arguing that a major function of the “well regulated militia” of the Second Amendment during colonial and post-revolutionary times was the maintenance of slavery in the South and the suppression of slave rebellion); Robert J. Cot-trol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Geo. L.J. 309 (1991) (tracing the discriminatory intent of early firearms restrictions), then the Fourteenth Amendment is the appropriate vehicle for that bias to be ferreted out and eliminated.

Contrary to the assertions of some, the modern firearm regulations at issue in this case should not be confused with the Black Codes, other discriminatory laws that the Fourteenth Amendment invalidated, or more recent cases where Fourteenth Amendment protections have been implicated. The Fourteenth Amendment’s protections rightly extend in the face of a colorable assertion that the District’s firearm regulations (or those of any other jurisdiction) are racially discriminatory in origin or application, but such a showing has not been made here or even alleged by Respondents.

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**Brief for Congress of Racial Equality as Amicus Curiae**  

. . . The Congress of Racial Equality, Inc. (“CORE”) is a New York not-for-profit corporation founded in 1942, with national headquarters in Harlem, New York City. CORE is a nationwide civil rights organization, with consultative status at the United Nations, which is primarily interested in the welfare of the black community, and the protection of the civil rights of all citizens.

**Summary of Argument**

The history of gun control in America has been one of discrimination, disenfranchisement and oppression of racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants,

More recently, facially neutral gun control laws have been enacted for the alleged purpose of controlling crime. Often, however, the actual purpose or the actual effect of such laws has been to discriminate or oppress certain groups. *Id.; Ex Parte Lavinder*, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.E. 428 (1921) (striking down martial law regulation inhibiting possession and carrying of arms). As Justice Buford of the Florida Supreme Court noted in his concurring opinion narrowly construing a Florida gun control statute:

I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers in this State drawn here for the purpose of working in turpentine and lumber camps. The same condition existed when the Act was amended in 1901 and the Act was passed for the purpose of disarming the negro laborers. . . . The statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in practice has never been so applied. . . . [T]here has never been, within my knowledge, any effort to enforce the provisions of this statute as to white people, because it has been generally conceded to be in contravention of the Constitution and nonenforceable if contested.

*Watson v. Stone*, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (1941) (Buford, J., concurring).

The worst abuses at present occur under the mantle of facially neutral laws that are, however, enforced in a discriminatory manner. Even those laws that are passed with the intent that they be applied to all, are often enforced in a discriminatory fashion and have a disparate impact upon blacks, the poor and other minorities. Present day enforcement of gun laws frequently targets minorities and the poor, and often results in illegal searches and seizures.

**ARGUMENT**

**I. GUN CONTROL MEASURES HAVE BEEN AND ARE USED TO DISARM AND OPPRESS BLACKS AND OTHER MINORITIES . . .**

**E. GUN CONTROL IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY . . .**

Most of the American handgun ownership restrictions adopted between 1901 and 1934 followed on the heels of highly publicized incidents involving the incipient black civil rights movement, foreign-born radicals, or labor agitators. In 1934, Hawaii, and in 1930, Oregon, passed gun control statutes in response to labor organizing efforts in the Port of Honolulu and the Oregon lumber mills.
In its opening statement, in the NAACP’s lawsuit against the firearms industry, the NAACP admitted the importance of the constitutional right:

Certainly the NAACP of all organizations in this country understands and respects the constitutional right to bear arms. Upon the NAACP’s founding in 1909 in New York City, soon thereafter it took up its first criminal law case [i]n Ossien, Michigan, where a black male, Mr. Sweet, was charged with killing a white supremacist along with several accomplices. The court, to rule out Mr. Sweet and his family to be pushed out of their home in Michigan, it was in that case that the presiding judge, to uphold Mr. Sweet’s right to be with his family, coined the popular phrase “a man’s home is his castle.”

NAACP et al. v. Acusport, Inc. et al., Trial Tr. at 103. (The incident actually occurred in Detroit—not “Ossien”—Michigan in 1926. The NAACP and Clarence Darrow came to the defense of Dr. Ossian Sweet who had fatally shot a person in a white mob which was attacking his home because Dr. Sweet had moved into an all-white neighborhood. Furthermore, the phrase “a man’s home is his castle,” while certainly relevant to the Sweet case, first appears in an English 1499 case.)

After World War I, a generation of young blacks, often led by veterans familiar with firearms and willing to fight for the equal treatment that they had received in other lands, began to assert their civil rights. In response, the Klan again became a major force in the South in the 1910s and 1920s. Often public authorities stood by while murders, beatings, and lynchings were openly perpetrated upon helpless black citizens. And once again, gun control laws made sure that the victims of the Klan’s violence were unarmed and did not possess the ability to defend themselves, while at the same time cloaking the often specially deputized Klansmen in the safety of their monopoly of arms. [Don Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Skeptics Speak Out 19. (D. Kates ed. 1979).]

The Klan was also present in force in southern New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Oregon. Between 1913 and 1934, these states enacted either handgun permit laws or laws barring alien handgun possession. The Klan targeted not only blacks, but also Catholics, Jews, labor radicals, and the foreign born; and these people also ran the risk of falling victim to lynch mobs or other more clandestine attacks, often after the victims had been disarmed by state or local authorities. Id. at 19-20.

II. CURRENT GUN CONTROL EFFORTS: A LEGACY OF RACISM

Behind current gun control efforts often lurks the remnant of an old prejudice, that the lower classes and minorities, especially blacks, are not to be trusted with firearms. Today, the thought remains among gun control advocates; if the poor or blacks are allowed to have firearms, they will commit crimes with them. Even noted gun control activists have admitted this. Gun control proponent and journalist Robert Sherrill frankly admitted that the Gun Control Act of 1968 was “passed not to control guns but to control Blacks.” Robert Sherrill, The Saturday Night Special 280 (1972). “It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the ‘Saturday night special’ is emphasized because it is cheap and
it is being sold to a particular class of people. The name is sufficient evidence—
the reference is to ‘nigger-town Saturday night.’” Barry Bruce-Briggs, The Great
American Gun War, The Public Interest, Fall 1976, at 37.

The worst abuses at present occur under the mantle of facially neutral laws
that are, however, enforced in a discriminatory manner. Even those laws that
are passed with the intent that they be applied to all, are often enforced in
a discriminatory fashion and have a disparate impact upon blacks, the poor,
and other minorities. In many jurisdictions which require a discretionary gun
permit, licensing authorities have wide discretion in issuing a permit, and those
jurisdictions unfavorable to gun ownership, or to the race, politics, or appear-
ance of a particular applicant frequently maximize obstructions to such persons
while favored individuals and groups experience no difficulty in the granting
of a permit. Hardy and Chotiner, “The Potential for Civil Liberties Violations in
the Enforcement of Handgun Prohibitions” in Restricting Handguns: The Liberal
Skeptics Speak Out, supra, at 209-10; William Tonso, Gun Control: White Man’s Law,
Reason, Dec. 1985, at 24. In St. Louis,

permits are automatically denied . . . to wives who don’t have their husband’s per-
mission, homosexuals, and non-voters. . . . As one of my students recently learned,
a personal “interview” is now required for every St. Louis application. After many
delays, he finally got to see the sheriff who looked at him only long enough to see
that he wasn’t black, yelled “he’s alright” to the permit secretary, and left.


New York’s infamous Sullivan Law, originally enacted to disarm Southern
and Eastern European immigrants who were considered racially inferior and
religiously and ideologically suspect, continues to be enforced in a racist and
elitist fashion “as the police seldom grant hand gun permits to any but the
wealthy or politically influential.” Tonso, supra, at 24.

New York City permits are issued only to the very wealthy, the politically powerful,
and the socially elite. Permits are also issued to: private guard services employed
by the very wealthy, the banks, and the great corporations; to ward heelers1 and
political influence peddlers; . . .

Kates, “Introduction,” in Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Skeptics Speak Out,
supra, at 5.

A. BY PROHIBITING THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, THE STATE DISCRIMINATES
AGAINST MINORITY AND POOR CITIZENS

The obvious effect of gun prohibitions is to deny law-abiding citizens access
to firearms for the defense of themselves and their families. That effect is doubly

1. [A “ward heeler” is a political operative who works for a political machine or party
boss in a ward or other local area.—Eds.]
discriminatory because the poor, and especially the black poor, are the primary victims of crime and in many areas lack the necessary police protection.

African Americans, especially poor blacks, are disproportionately the victims of crime, and the situation for households headed by black women is particularly difficult. In 1977, more than half of black families had a woman head of household. A 1983 report by the U.S. Department of Labor states that:

among families maintained by a woman, the poverty rate for blacks was 51%, compared with 24% for their white counterparts in 1977. . . . Families maintained by a woman with no husband present have compromised an increasing proportion of both black families and white families in poverty; however, families maintained by a woman have become an overwhelming majority only among poor black families. . . . About 60% of the 7.7 million blacks below the poverty line in 1977 were living in families maintained by a black woman.


The problems of these women are far more than merely economic. National figures indicate that a black female in the median female age range of 25-34 is about twice as likely to be robbed or raped as her white counterpart. She is also three times as likely to be the victim of an aggravated assault. Id. at 90. See United States Census Bureau, *U.S. Statistical Abstract* (1983). A 1991 DOJ study concluded that “[b]lack women were significantly more likely to be raped than white women.” Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Female Victims of Violent Crime* 8 (1991). “Blacks are eight times more likely to be victims of homicide and two and one-half times more likely to be rape victims. For robbery, the black victimization rate is three times that for whites. . . .” Paula McClain, *Firearms Ownership, Gun Control Attitudes, and Neighborhood Environments*, 5 Law & Pol’y Q. 299, 301 (1983).

The need for the ability to defend oneself, family, and property is much more critical in the poor and minority neighborhoods ravaged by crime and without adequate police protection. Id.; Don Kates, *Handgun Control: Prohibition Revisited*, Inquiry, Dec. 1977, at 21. However, citizens have no right to demand or even expect police protection. Courts have consistently ruled “that there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.” *Bowers v. DeVito*, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, courts have ruled that the police have no duty to protect the individual citizen. *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Serv.*, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004 (1989); *South v. Maryland*, 59 U.S. 396 (1855); *Morgan v. District of Columbia*, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. App. 1983) (en banc); *Warren v. District of Columbia*, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc); *Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County*, 360 Md. 617 (1986).

The fundamental civil rights regarding the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, the right of self-defense and the right to keep and bear arms, are merely empty promises if a legislature is allowed to restrict the means by which one can protect oneself and one’s family. This constitutional deprivation discriminates against the poor and minority citizen who is more exposed to the acts of criminal violence and who is less protected by the state.

Reducing gun ownership among law-abiding citizens may significantly reduce the proven deterrent effect of widespread civilian gun ownership on criminals, particularly in regard to such crimes as residential burglaries and
commercial robberies. Of course, this effect will be most widely felt among the poor and minority citizens who live in crime-ridden areas without adequate police protection.

**B. THE ENFORCEMENT OF GUN PROHIBITIONS SPUR INCREASED CIVIL LIBERTIES VIOLATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MINORITIES AND THE POOR**

Constitutional protections, other than those afforded by the right to keep and bear arms, have been and are threatened by the enforcement of restrictive firearms laws. The enforcement of present firearms controls account for a large number of citizen and police interactions, particularly in those jurisdictions in which the purchase or possession of certain firearms are prohibited. Between 1989 and 1998, arrests for weapons carrying and possession numbered between 136,049 and 224,395 annually. FBI Uniform Crime Reports, *Crime in the United States Annual Reports (1989-1998)* Table: Total Arrests, Distribution by Age.

The most common and, perhaps, the primary means of enforcing present firearms laws are illegal searches by the police. A former Ohio prosecutor has stated that in his opinion 50% to 75% of all weapon arrests resulted from questionable, if not clearly illegal, searches. *Federal Firearms Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee*, 94th Cong. 1589 (1975) [hereinafter House Hearings]. A study of Detroit criminal cases found that 85% of concealed weapons carrying cases that were dismissed, were dismissed due to the illegality of the search. This number far exceeded even the 57% percent for narcotics dismissals, in which illegal searches are frequent. Note, *Some Observations on the Disposition of CCW Cases in Detroit*, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 614, 620-21 (1976). A study of Chicago criminal cases found that motions to suppress for illegal evidence were filed in 36% of all weapons charges; 62% of such motions were granted by the court. Critique, *On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluation of the Exclusionary Rule*, 69 N.W. U. L. Rev. 740, 750 (1974). A Chicago judge presiding over a court devoted solely to gun law violations has stated:

The primary area of contest in most gun cases is in the area of search and seizure. . . . Constitutional search and seizure issues are probably more regularly argued in this court than anywhere in America. . . . More than half these contested cases begin with the motion to suppress . . . these arguments dispose of more contested matters than any other.

House Hearings, *supra*, at 508 (testimony of Judge D. Shields).

These suppression hearing figures represent only a tiny fraction of the actual number of illegal searches that take place in the enforcement of current gun laws, as they do not include the statistics for illegal searches that do not produce a firearm or in which the citizen is not charged with an offense. The ACLU has noted that the St. Louis police department, in the mid-1970s, made more than 25,000 illegal searches “on the theory that any black, driving a late model car has an illegal gun.” However, these searches produced only 117 firearms. Kates, *Handgun Control: Prohibition Revisited*, *supra*, at 23.

In light of these facts, many of the proponents of gun control have commented on the need to restrict other constitutionally-guaranteed rights in order
A. Firearms Policy and the Black Community


*Florida v. J.L.* involved a defendant who had been stopped, searched, and arrested by Miami police after an anonymous telephone caller claimed that one of three black males fitting the defendant’s description was in possession of a firearm. Amongst other arguments, the State asked the Court to carve out a gun exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court unanimously declined to create such an exception to the Fourth Amendment. *Florida v. J.L.*, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).

Statistics and past history show that many millions of otherwise law-abiding Americans would not heed any gun ban. One should consider America’s past experience with liquor prohibition. Furthermore, in many urban neighborhoods, especially those of poor blacks and other minorities, the possession of a firearm for self-defense is often viewed as a necessity in light of inadequate police protection.

Federal and state authorities in 1975 estimated that there were two million illegal handguns among the population of New York City. Selwyn Raab, *2 Million Illegal Pistols Believed Within the City*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1975, at 1 (estimate by BATF); N.Y. Post, Oct. 7, 1975, at 5, col. 3 (estimate by Manhattan District Attorney). In a 1975 national poll, some 92% of the respondents estimated that 50% or more of handgun owners would defy a confiscation law. 121 Cong. Rec. S189, 1 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975).

Even registration laws, as opposed to outright bans, measure a high percentage of non-compliance among the citizenry. In regard to Illinois’ firearm owner registration law, Chicago Police estimated the rate of non-compliance at over two thirds, while statewide non-compliance was estimated at three fourths. In 1976, Cleveland city authorities estimated the rate of compliance with Cleveland’s handgun registration law at less than 12%. Kates, *supra*, *Handgun Control: Prohibition Revisited*, at 20 n.1. In regard to citizens’ compliance with Cleveland’s “assault gun” ban, a Cleveland Police Lieutenant stated: “To the best of our knowledge, no assault weapon was voluntarily turned over to the Cleveland Police Department. . . . [C]onsidering the value that these weapons have, it certainly was doubtful individuals would willingly relinquish one.” Associated Press, *Cleveland Reports No Assault Guns Turned In*, Gun Week, Aug. 10, 1990, at 2.

In response to New Jersey’s “assault weapon” ban, as of the required registration date, only 88 of the 300,000 or more affected weapons in New Jersey had been registered, none had been surrendered to the police and only 7 had been rendered inoperable. Masters, *Assault Gun Compliance Law*, Asbury Park Press, Dec. 1, 1990, at 1. As of November 28, 1990, only 5,150 guns of the estimated 300,000 semiautomatic firearms banned by the May 1989 California “Assault

These results suggest that the majority of otherwise law-abiding citizens will not obey a gun prohibition law; much less criminals, who will disregard such laws anyway. It is ludicrous to believe that those who will rob, rape and murder will turn in their firearms or any other weapons they may possess to the police, or that they would be deterred from possessing them or using them by the addition of yet another gun control law to the more than twenty thousand gun laws that are already on the books in the U.S. James Wright, Peter Rossi and Kathleen Daly, *Under the Gun: Weapons, Crime and Violence in America* 244 (1983).

A serious attempt to enforce a gun prohibition would require an immense number of searches of residential premises. Furthermore, the bulk of these intrusions will, no doubt, be directed against racial minorities, whose possession of arms the enforcing authorities may view as far more dangerous than illegal arms possession by other groups.

As civil liberties attorney Kates has observed, when laws are difficult to enforce, “enforcement becomes progressively haphazard until at last the laws are used only against those who are unpopular with the police.” Of course minorities, especially minorities who don’t “know their place,” aren’t likely to be popular with the police, and those very minorities, in the face of police indifference or perhaps even antagonism, may be the most inclined to look to guns for protection—guns that they can’t acquire legally and that place them in jeopardy if possessed illegally. While the intent of such laws may not be racist, their effect most certainly is.

Tonso, *supra*, at 25. . .

**NOTES & QUESTIONS**

1. Do you find the NAACP’s or CORE’s arguments more convincing?

2. Imagine you are a legislator and have just reviewed the arguments and empirical claims in these two briefs. What questions would you ask representatives of CORE and the NAACP?

3. Do the two briefs reveal any common ground?

4. As a matter of policy, which view seems to offer the most practical pathway to public safety? What about individual safety? Are public safety measures and individual safety measures compatible?

5. The *Heller* (Ch.10.A) and *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Ch.10.B) decisions affirm a right of legal gun ownership for people who are not disqualified by reason of criminal activity or mental incapacity and who satisfy reasonable local and state requirements. What is the threat posed by legal handguns in the possession of such people?
6. Michael de Leeuw, who headed the NAACP’s amicus submission in *Heller*, argues that the modern civil rights agenda should include weakening *Heller* so as to permit local governments to ban handguns. Such exceptions would permit revival of Washington, D.C.’s overturned gun ban, which de Leeuw argues should be respected as an exercise of black community autonomy. See Michael B. de Leeuw et al., *Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and Communities of Color*, 25 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 133 (2009). Professor Nicholas Johnson takes a different view, arguing that (1) stringent gun control requires a level of trust in the competence and benevolence of government that is difficult to square with the black experience in America; (2) historically, armed self-defense in the face of state failure has been a crucial private resource for blacks; (3) as a matter of practice and philosophy, blacks from the leadership to the grass roots have supported armed self-defense by maintaining a distinction between counterproductive political violence and indispensable self-defense against imminent threats; and (4) isolated gun bans cannot work in a nation already saturated with guns. See Nicholas J. Johnson, *Firearms and the Black Community: An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy*, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 1491 (2013).

**B. Gender**


**Summary of Argument**

Domestic violence is a pervasive societal problem that affects a significant number of women and children each year. Correctly recognized as a national crisis, domestic violence accounts for a significant portion of all violence against women and children. The effect of such violence on the lives of its victims shocks the conscience. Domestic violence victims are battered and killed. They are terrorized and traumatized. They are unable to function as normal citizens because they live under the constant threat of harassment, injury, and violence. And these are just the more obvious effects. Other wounds exist beneath the surface—injuries that are not so easily recognizable as a bruise or a broken bone, but that affect victims’ lives just the same. For example, victims often miss work due to their injuries, and must struggle with the prospect of losing their jobs, resulting in significant financial and emotional burdens. Lacking safe outlets for escape or legal recourse, these victims persevere.

One particularly ominous statistic stands out in its relevance here: domestic violence accounts for between one-third and almost one-half of the female murders in the United States. These murders are most often committed by
intimate partners with handguns. And while murder is the most serious crime that an abuser with a gun can commit, it is not the only crime; short of murder, batterers also use handguns to threaten, intimidate, and coerce victims. Handguns empower batterers and provide them with deadly capabilities, exacerbating an already pervasive problem.

This crisis has not gone unaddressed; Congress and numerous states have attempted to limit the access that batterers have to handguns. Chief among the Congressional statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which addresses the lethal and widespread connection between domestic violence and access to firearms by prohibiting those convicted of domestic violence crimes from possessing guns. Many states also have laws addressing the nexus between domestic violence and firearms. For example, faced with a record of handgun violence in its urban environment, including domestic gun violence, the District of Columbia (“the District”) enacted comprehensive legislation regulating handgun possession. . . . The D.C. Council had ample empirical justifications for determining that such laws were the best method for reducing gun violence in the District. Important government interests support statutes and regulations intended to reduce the number of domestic violence incidents that turn deadly; such statutes should be given substantial deference. . . .

**ARGUMENT**

Women are killed by intimate partners—husbands, lovers, ex-husbands, or ex-lovers—more often than by any other category of killer. It is the leading cause of death for African-American women aged 15-45 and the seventh leading cause of premature death for U.S. women overall. Intimate partner homicides make up 40 to 50 percent of all murders of women in the United States, [and that number excludes ex-lovers, which account for as much as 11 percent of intimate partner homicides of women]. . . . When a gun [is] in the house, an abused woman [is] 6 times more likely than other abused women to be killed. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., *Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide*, NIJ Journal, Nov. 2003, at 15, 16, 18 [hereinafter *Risk Factors*].

**I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS A SERIOUS CRIME THAT LEAVES MILLIONS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN NATIONWIDE SCARRED BOTH PHYSICALLY AND EMOTIONALLY**

. . . Experts in the field of domestic violence have come to understand domestic violence as a pattern of coercive controls broader than the acts recognized by the legal definition, including a range of emotional, psychological, and financial tactics and harms batterers perpetrate against victims. Regardless of the definition applied, domestic violence is a profound social problem with far-reaching consequences throughout the United States. Between 2001 and 2005, intimate partner violence constituted, on average, 22% of violent crime against women. In the United States, intimate partner violence results each year in almost two million injuries and over half a million hospital
emergency room visits. About 22% of women, and seven percent of men, report having been physically assaulted by an intimate partner. According to one study of crimes reported by police in 18 states and the District, family violence accounted for 33% of all violent crimes; 53% of those crimes were between spouses.

Domestic violence has severe and devastating effects. Injuries such as broken bones, bruises, burns, and death, are physical manifestations of its consequences. But there are also emotional and societal impacts. Domestic violence is characterized by a pattern of terror, domination, and control—it thus obstructs victims’ efforts to escape abuse and achieve safety. Victims of domestic violence often have difficulty establishing independent lives due to poor credit, rental, and employment histories resulting from their abuse. Similarly, victims often miss work due to their injuries and can ultimately lose their jobs as a result of the violence against them. Moreover, the injuries that domestic violence causes go beyond the immediate injury. Chronic domestic violence is associated with poor health, and can manifest itself as stress-related mental and physical health problems for as long as a year after the abuse.

Above all, incidents of abuse often turn deadly. American women who die by homicide are most often killed by their intimate partners—according to various studies, at least one-third, Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Stat., *Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001*, NCJ 197838, at 1 (Feb. 2003) and perhaps up to one-half of female murder victims, are killed by an intimate partner. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., *Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide*, NIJ Journal, Nov. 2003, at 18. A study based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Report found that female murder victims were more than 12 times as likely to have been killed by a man they knew than by a male stranger. Violence Policy Center, *When Men Murder Women: An Analysis of 2005 Homicide Data*, at 3 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter *When Men Murder Women*]. Of murder victims who knew their offenders, 62% were killed by their husband or intimate acquaintance. Id.

Although victims bear the primary physical and emotional brunt of domestic violence, society pays an economic price. Victims require significant medical attention. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that the health-related costs of domestic violence approach $4.1 billion every year. Gun-related injuries account for a large portion of that cost. Combined increased healthcare costs and lost productivity cost the United States over $5.8 billion each year. Domestic violence also accounts for a substantial portion of criminal justice system activity. For example, according to a study assessing the economic impact of domestic violence in Tennessee, the state of Tennessee spends about $49.9 million annually in domestic violence court processing fees. . . .

## II. Firearms Exacerbate an Already Deadly Crisis

Domestic violence perpetrators use firearms in their attacks with alarming frequency. Of every 1,000 U.S. women, 16 have been threatened with a gun, and seven have had a gun used against them by an intimate partner. See
Kathleen A. Vittes & Susan B. Sorenson, Are Temporary Restraining Orders More Likely to Be Issued When Applications Mention Firearms?, 30 Evaluation Rev. 266, 277 (2006) (one in six victims of domestic violence who filed for a restraining order at the Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Barrister’s Domestic Violence Project clinic between May 2003 and January 2004 reported being threatened or harmed by a firearm). “American women who are killed by their intimate partners are more likely to be killed with guns than by all other methods combined. In fact, each year from 1980 to 2000, 60% to 70% of batterers who killed their female intimate partners used firearms to do so.” Emily F. Rothman et al., Batterers’ Use of Guns to Threaten Intimate Partners, 60 J. Am. Med. Women’s Ass’n 62, 62 (2005) (noting also that “[f]our percent to 5% of women who have experienced nonlethal intimate partner violence . . . have reported that partners threatened them with guns at some point in their lives”). See Susan B. Sorenson, Firearm Use in Intimate Partner Violence, 30 Evaluation Rev. 229, 232 (2006) (“Women are more than twice as likely to be shot by their male intimates as they are to be shot, stabbed, strangled, bludgeoned, or killed in any other way by a stranger.”) (citation omitted); Susan B. Sorenson, Taking Guns From Batterers, 30 Evaluation Rev. 361, 362 (2006) (between 1976 to 2002, women in the United States were 2.2 times more likely to die of a gunshot wound inflicted by a male intimate partner than from any form of assault by a stranger); When Men Murder Women, supra, at 3 (in 2005, “more female homicides were committed with firearms (52 percent) than with any other weapon’); Vittes & Sorenson, supra, at 267 (55% of intimate partner homicides in 2002 were committed with a firearm).

Thus, every year, 700-800 women are shot and killed by their spouses or intimate partners, and handguns are the weapon of choice. For example, according to the Violence Policy Center, “[i]n 2000, in homicides where the weapon was known, 50 percent (1,342 of 2,701) of female homicide victims were killed with a firearm. Of those female firearm homicides, 1,009 women (75 percent) were killed with a handgun.” The number remains relatively consistent. In 2004, 72% of women killed by firearms were killed by handguns. When Men Murder Women, supra, at 3.

The mere presence of or access to a firearm increases fatality rates in instances of abuse. A person intent on committing violence will naturally reach for the deadliest weapon available. Accordingly, the presence of a gun in an already violent home acts as a catalyst, increasing the likelihood that domestic violence will result in severe injury or death. See, e.g., [Kathryn E. Moracco et al., Preventing Firearm Violence Among Victims of Intimate Partner Violence: An Evaluation of a New North Carolina Law 1 (2006)]; Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. of Pub. Health 1089, 1090 (2003) (the intimate partner’s access to a gun is strongly associated with intimate partner homicide). Estimates of the increased likelihood of death when a firearm is present vary. Compare When Men Murder Women, supra, at 2 (three times more likely), with Risk Factors, supra, at 16 (six times more likely). When domestic violence incidents involve a firearm, the victim is 12 times more likely to die as compared to incidents not involving a firearm. Shannon Frattaroli & Jon S. Vernick, Separating Batterers and Guns, 30 Evaluation Rev. 296, 297 (2006).
Even when he does not actually fire his weapon, a batterer may use a gun as a tool to “threaten, intimidate, and coerce.” Vittes & Sorenson, supra, at 267. For example, batterers make threats with their firearm by pointing it at the victim; cleaning it; shooting it outside; threatening to harm people, pets, or others about whom the victim cares; or threatening suicide. Such threats do not leave physical marks, but they can result in emotional problems, such as post-traumatic stress disorder. Thus, a firearm is a constant lethal threat, and its presence may inhibit a victim of abuse from seeking help or from attempting to leave the relationship.

The statistics reveal a stark reality—guns exacerbate the already pervasive problem of domestic violence. The use of firearms intensifies the severity of the violence and increases the likelihood that domestic violence victims will be killed by their intimate partners.


**SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

This case provides the Court an opportunity to advance the ability of women to free themselves from being subject to another’s ill will and to counter the commonly-held prejudice that women are “easier targets” simply because of their gender characteristics. Violence against women in the United States is endemic, often deadly, and most frequently committed by men superior in physical strength to their female victims.

The District’s current prohibition against handguns and immediately serviceable firearms in the home effectively eliminates a woman’s ability to defend her very life and those of her children against violent attack. Women are simply less likely to be able to thwart violence using means currently permitted under D.C. law. Women are generally less physically strong, making it less likely that most physical confrontations will end favorably for women. Women with access to immediately disabling means, however, have been proven to benefit from the equalization of strength differential a handgun provides. Women’s ability to own such serviceable firearms is indeed of even greater importance given the holdings of both federal and state courts that there is no individual right to police protection.

Washington, D.C.’s current firearms regulations are facially gender-neutral, and according to Petitioners, were intended to decrease the incidents of firearms violence equally among both men and women. . . . What the District’s current firearms laws do is manifest “gross indifference” to the self-defense needs of women. Effectively banning the possession of handguns ignores biological differences between men and women, and in fact allows gender-inspired violence free rein. . . .
ARGUMENT

I. THE TIME HAS LONG PASSED WHEN SOCIAL CONDITIONS MANDATED THAT ALL WOMEN EQUALLY DEPEND UPON THE PROTECTION OF MEN FOR THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY

For centuries the concept of women’s self-defense was as nonexistent as the idea that women were to, and could, provide their own means of financial support. That women themselves could possibly have some responsibility for their own fates was not only not a topic for debate, but would have been deemed a foolish absurdity.

A. THE DEFENSE OF WOMEN AS MEN’S SOLE PREROGATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Such paternalism reflected widely-accepted views of men’s physical prowess vis-à-vis women generally and the roles women were expected to play in society. Few women expected to leave the confines of their families before marriage.

B. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS HEIGHTEN THE NEED FOR MANY WOMEN TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN PHYSICAL SECURITY

Throughout history, family and household demographics reinforced the expectation that men would be available to provide protection to women and children. Extended families were the norm across all cultural backgrounds, providing women the immediately available support of fathers, brothers, and husbands. In 1900, only 5% of households in the United States consisted of people living alone, while nearly half the population lived in households of six or more individuals.

Widespread demographic changes now make it far less likely that women will live in households with an adult male present to provide the traditionally-expected protection. In 2000, slightly more than 25 percent of individuals lived in households consisting only of themselves. Between 1970 and 2000, the proportion of women aged 20 to 24 who had never married increased from 36 to 73 percent; for women aged 30 to 34, that proportion tripled from 6 to 22 percent. While these statistics do not reflect the increasing percentage of women who choose to cohabit without marriage, it should be noted that these percentages of women living alone are likely higher in metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic.

These statistics do not emphasize the rapidly increasing number of single mothers in the District. According to a 2005 survey, there are over 46,000 single mothers living within Washington, D.C. Of those single mothers, almost half live in poverty. These women are the most immediate and often sole source of protection of their children against abusive ex-husbands, ex-boyfriends, or unknown criminals who prey on the District’s most vulnerable households. Many do not have the resources to choose neighborhoods in
which their children face few threats or to install expensive monitoring systems and alarms. Moreover, many will not have the knowledge or social network to access those violence prevention services available. An inexpensive handgun, properly stored to prevent access to children, could therefore very well be the sole means available for these women to protect themselves and their children. See also Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, et al., in Support of Respondent (“Int’l L. Enf. Educ. & Trainers Assoc. Br.”) at section II.D. (discussing the increasingly rare incidents of gun accidents).

In addition to young women and those who are single mothers, there is an increasing number of elderly women who live alone and feel highly vulnerable to violent crime. Greater improvements in female than in male mortality rates have increased the percentage of women aged 65 and older who live alone. From 1960 to 2000, women aged 65 and over accounted for a single digit percentage of the total population but more than 30 percent of households consisting of only one person. This population of older women living alone will only increase as baby boomers age and fewer children are capable of caring for aging parents. Some 40 percent of elderly and mid-life women have below-median incomes, leaving them with little or no choice of neighborhoods and expensive security measures. Edward R. Roybal, The Quality of Life for Older Women: Older Women Living Alone, H.R. Rep. No. 100-693, at 1 (2d Sess. 1989).

II. EQUAL PROTECTION IN WASHINGTON, D.C. NOW MEANS THAT WOMEN ARE EQUALLY FREE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES FROM PHYSICAL ASSAULT WITHOUT THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS TO TRULY EQUALIZE GENDER-BASED PHYSICAL DIFFERENCES

... Violence against women is predominately gender-based, most often perpetrated by men against the women in their lives. Men who react with violence against women in the domestic sphere often seek to reassert their control over those whom the men believe should be held as subordinates. Since 1976, approximately 30% of all U.S. female murder victims have been killed by their male, intimate partners.

A. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE DISTRICT’S RESPONSE

In 2005, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) received over 11,000 calls reporting a domestic violence crime or about 30 calls per day. There were 51 murders attributed to domestic violence between 2001 and 2004, counting only those cases in which the so-called victim-offender relation could be proven. These statistics of course cannot convey the number of women who live in perpetual fear that an abuser will return and escalate the violence already experienced. As to those women who are able to report domestic violence-related crimes or who choose to do so, the MPD is often simply unable to take any proactive measures to protect their safety. In 2004, the MPD’s Civil
Protection and Temporary Protection Unit was able to locate and serve only 49.6% of those against whom a protection order had been issued.

Such statistics are even more alarming when it is understood that domestic batterers who ultimately take the lives of women are repeat offenders, most likely those with both a criminal background and repeated assaults against the women they eventually murder. Murray A. Straus, Ph.D., *Domestic Violence and Homicide Antecedents*, 62 Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med. 457 (No. 5 June 1986). These are not men who inexplicably react violently one day and then never again present a threat. One study found that a history of domestic violence was present in 95.8% of the intra-family homicides studied. In 2004, the District’s Police Department reported that of the 7,449 homes from which domestic violence was reported, almost 13% had three or more calls that year alone. These numbers cannot account for the violence that is never reported, or for which only some incidents are reported.

Women who eventually face life-threatening dangers from a domestic abuser or stalker are therefore well aware of the specific threat presented. In fact, Petitioners’ Amici may well be correct in their claim that “female murder victims were more than 12 times as likely to have been killed by a man they knew than by a male stranger” and that “[o]f murder victims who knew their offenders, 62% were killed by their husband or intimate acquaintance.” *Brief of Amici Curiae National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al.*, in Support of Petitioners at 23 (“Pets’ Network Br.”). Such knowledge of an individualized threat should allow women to more easily prepare the best defenses they can employ, using their ability to weigh the threat against their ability to protect themselves should the threat ever become one of serious bodily injury or death. Current D.C. gun restrictions on handguns and serviceable firearms in the home simply eliminate that option for women altogether.

Those women who are attacked by strangers or whose children are in danger should also be provided the option of choosing a firearm if they would feel safer having one in their home. Other women who live alone, particularly the elderly who are more likely to be of lower incomes, may not have choices as to where they must live, nor the ability to relocate if stalked. These women too should be able to weigh the threat of an unknown assailant against their ability to defend themselves should they ever be attacked in the privacy of their own homes.

Without the freedom to have a readily available firearm in the home, a woman is at a tremendous disadvantage when attempting to deter or stop an assailant should her attacker allow her no other option. Reflecting upon one of the most notorious tragedies of domestic abuse turned murder, Andrea Dworkin stated directly the stakes involved:

Though the legal system has mostly consoled and protected batterers, when a woman is being beaten, it’s the batterer who has to be stopped; as Malcolm X used to say, “by any means necessary”—a principle women, all women, had better learn. A woman has a right to her own bed, a home she can’t be thrown out of, and for her body not to be ransacked and broken into. She has a right to safe refuge, to expect her family and friends to stop the batterer—by law or force—before she’s dead. She has a constitutional right to a gun and a legal right to kill if she believes
she’s going to be killed. And a batterer’s repeated assaults should lawfully be taken as intent to kill.


It must be added, however, that it is not just the physical cost of violence against women that must be considered. A woman who feels helpless in her own home is simply not an autonomous individual, controlling her own fate and able to “participate fully in political life.” While possessing a handgun or a serviceable long gun in the home will of course not erase all incidents of sex-based violence against women, denying women the right to choose such an option for themselves does nothing but prevent the independent governance women must be afforded.

Self-defense classes, particularly those involving training women to use handguns, often help to provide women the sense of self-worth necessary for them to feel equals in civil society. See Martha McCaughey, Real Knockouts: The Physical Feminism of Women’s Self-Defense (N.Y. Univ. Press 1997). Women who take such classes no longer see themselves as powerless potential victims, but as individuals who may demand that their rights be respected. There is some evidence that men recognize this transformation and alter their conduct toward those women. As one study noted, “[t]he knowledge that one can defend oneself—and that the self is valuable enough to merit defending—changes everything.” Jocelyn A. Hollander, “I Can Take Care of Myself”: The Impact of Self-Defense Training on Women’s Lives, 10 Violence Against Women 205, at 226-27 (2004). Therefore, even if women are never placed in a position to defend themselves with a firearm or their own bodies, there are less material but no less compelling justifications for allowing them that ability. E.g., Mary Zeiss Stange, From Domestic Terrorism to Armed Revolution: Women’s Right to Self-Defense as an Essential Human Right, 2 J. L. Econ. & Pol’y 385-91 (2006).

B. THE BENEFITS OF HANDGUNS FOR WOMEN FACING GRAVE THREAT

For years women were advised not to fight back and to attempt to sympathize with their attackers while looking for the first opportunity to escape. Well-meaning women’s advocates counseled that such passivity would result in fewer and less serious injuries than if a woman attempted to defend herself and angered the perpetrator. More recent, empirical studies indicate, however, that owning a firearm is one of the best means a woman can have for preventing crime against her. The National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”) indicates that allowing a woman to have a gun has a “much greater effect” on her ability to defend herself against crime than providing that same gun to a man. In fact, the NCVS and researchers have concluded that women who offer no resistance are 2.5 times more likely to be seriously injured than women who resist their attackers with a gun. While the overall injury rate for both men and women was 30.2%, only 12.8% of those using a firearm for self-protection were injured. Subjective data from the 1994 NCVS reveals that 65 percent of victims felt that self-defense improved their situation, while only 9 percent thought that fighting back caused them greater harm.
Given relative size disparities, men who threaten women and children can easily cause serious bodily injury or death using another type of weapon or no weapon at all. Between 1990 and 2005, 10% of wives and 14% of girlfriends who fell victim to homicide were murdered by men using only the men’s “force” and no weapon of any type. It should also be noted that a violent man turning a gun on a woman or child announces his intent to do them harm. A woman using a gun in self-defense does so rarely with the intent to cause death to her attacker. Instead, a woman in such a situation has the intent only to sufficiently stop the assault and to gain control of the situation in order to summon assistance. This simple brandishing of a weapon often results in the assailant choosing to discontinue the crime without a shot having been fired. See also Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. & Crimin. 150 (1995); Gary Kleck, Policy Lessons From Recent Gun Control Research, 49 Law and Contemporary Problems 35, 44 (No. 1 Winter 1986) (noting that only a small minority, 8.3% of defensive gun uses, resulted in the assailant’s injury or death).

The value of widespread handgun ownership lies not only in the individual instances in which a violent criminal is thwarted while attempting to harm someone, but in the general deterrent effects created by criminals’ knowledge of firearms ownership among potential victims. Women alarmed by a series of savage rapes in Orlando, Florida in 1966 rushed local gun stores to arm themselves in self-defense. In a widely publicized campaign, the Orlando Police Department trained approximately 3,000 in firearms safety. According to the FBI Uniform Crime Report for 1967, the city then experienced over an 88% reduction in rapes, while rape throughout Florida continued to increase by 5% and nationwide by 7%. Similar crime reduction efforts involving well-publicized firearms ownership in other U.S. cities saw comparable reductions in the rates of armed robbery and residential burglaries. See also Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a Deterrent to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, 18 Am. J. of Crim. L. 113, 153-56 (1991) (describing the deterrent effects handguns create for crimes requiring direct confrontation with a victim such as rape and robbery and for non-confrontational crime such as car theft and the burglary of unoccupied locations); Int’l L. Enf. Educ. & Trainers Assoc. Br. at sections I.B., I.G. (discussing the crime deterrence value of victim armament).

Violent criminals who may view women as easy targets find their jobs far less taxing in communities such as Washington, D.C. Researchers conducting the [National] Institute of Justice Felon Survey confirm the common-sense notion that those wishing to do harm often think closely before confronting an individual who may be armed. According to this survey, some 56% of the felons agreed that “[a] criminal is not going to mess around with a victim he knows is armed with a gun.” Over 80% agreed that “[a] smart criminal always tries to find out if his potential victim is armed,” while 57% admitted that “[m]ost criminals are more worried about meeting an armed victim than they are about running into the police.” Some 39% said they personally had been deterred from committing at least one crime because they believed the intended victim was armed, and 8% said they had done so “many” times. Almost three-quarters stated that “[o]ne reason burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that they fear being shot during the crime.” James D. Wright and Peter H. Rossi, 145 Armed and Considered Dangerous, a Survey of Felons and Their Firearms (Aldine de
Gruyter, 1986). Some 34% said they had been “scared off, shot at, wounded, or captured by an armed victim” at some point in their criminal careers, while almost 70% had at least one acquaintance who had a similar previous experience. Id. at 154-55.

Stalkers and abusive boyfriends, spouses, or ex-spouses may be even more significantly deterred than the hardened, career felons participating in this survey. Under current Washington, D.C. gun regulations, stalkers and violent intimate partners may be confident that their female victims have not armed themselves since the threats or violence began. Many of these men have already been emboldened by women’s failure to report such threats and previous violence, or by the oftentimes inadequate resources available to help such women. Allowing women the option to purchase a serviceable handgun will not deter all stalkers and abusive intimate partners willing to sacrifice their own lives. However, the fact that men inclined toward violence will know that women have that choice and may well have exercised it will no doubt inhibit those less willing to pay that price.

The District would like to restrict women’s choice of firearm to those it gauges most appropriate rather than to allow rational women the ability to decide whether a handgun is more suited to their needs. Petitioner’s Brief cites two articles from firearms magazines in which a shotgun is mentioned as appropriate for home defense. . . . An assembled shotgun is certainly better than nothing and could provide deterrence benefits provided it is accessible to a woman. However, most women are best served by a handgun, lighter in weight, lighter in recoil, far less unwieldy for women with shorter arm spans, and far more easily carried around the home than a shotgun or rifle. Moreover, women who are holding a handgun are able to phone for assistance, while any type of long gun requires two hands to keep the firearm pointed at an assailant. See also Int’l L. Enf. Educ. & Trainers Assoc. Br. at section III. The fact that two articles in firearms magazines suggest a long gun for home defense should not impinge upon the constitutional right for a woman to select the firearm she feels most meets her needs.

Petitioner’s Amici claims that allowing firearms in the home will only increase women’s risk of being murdered. In fact, Petitioners’ Amici Curiae opens its argument by stating that, when a gun is in the home, an abused woman is “6 times more likely” to be killed than other abused women. Pets’ Network Br. at 20. However, this statistic has some verifiable basis only when particular adjustments for other risk factors are weighed. Most importantly, any validity that statistic holds is only for battered women who live with abusers who have guns. The odds for an abused woman living apart from her abuser, when she herself has a firearm, are only 0.22, far below the 2.0 level required for statistical significance. The presence of a firearm is simply negligible compared to obvious forewarnings such as the man’s previous rape of the woman, previous threats with a weapon, and threats to kill the woman. Moreover, the “most important demographic risk factor for acts of intimate partner femicide” is the male’s unemployment. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., RN, et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 1090-92 (No. 7 July 2003). Programs that help women leave an already terribly violent situation and that decrease unemployment should therefore be keys to the abatement of femicide, not laws that serve only to disarm potential victims.

It must also be noted that allowing women handguns will not increase the type of random, violent crime that causes such uneasiness among District
Women are far less likely to commit murder than are men. Despite being roughly half of the U.S. population, women comprised only 10% of murder offenders in 2006 and 2004, only 7% in 2005. Even more important to note are the circumstances under which women kill. Some estimates indicate that between 85% and 90% of women who commit homicides do so against men who have battered them for years. Allison Bass, Women Far Less Likely to Kill than Men; No One Sure Why, Boston Globe, February 24, 1992, at 27. See also Int’l L. Enf. Educ. & Trainers Assoc. Br. at Section II.A. One 1992 study by the Georgia Department of Corrections reported that of the 235 women serving jail time for murder or manslaughter in Georgia, 102 were deemed domestic killings. Almost half those women claimed that their male partners had regularly beaten them. The vast majority of those who claimed previous beatings had repeatedly reported the domestic violence to law enforcement. Kathleen O’Shea, Women on Death Row in Women Prisoners: A Forgotten Population 85 (Beverly Fletcher et al. eds., Praeger, 1993). See also Angela Browne, Assault and Homicide at Home: When Battered Women Kill, in 3 Advances in Applied Soc. Psych. 61 (Michael Saks & Leonard Saxe, eds., 1986) (including FBI data that 4.8% of all U.S. homicides are women who have killed an intimate partner in self-defense.) While these deaths are of course tragic, their occurrences do not indicate that women with access to handguns will commit the random acts of violence law-abiding residents most fear.

Men and women with a history of aggression, domestic violence, and mental disturbance are already prohibited from possessing firearms under both federal and District of Columbia law. Federal law bars possession to any individual who has been convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” who is an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution,” who is under an active restraining order, or who has been “convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (3), (4), (8), (9). Washington, D.C. law contains similar provisions, but adds as prohibited persons chronic alcoholics and those who have been “adjudicated negligent in a firearm mishap causing death or serious injury to another human being.” D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.03(a)(5), (a)(8). Rigorous enforcement of existing law should therefore minimize the risk that both men and women with histories of violence, mental instability, or negligence with a firearm will have a firearm in their homes.

C. WOMEN MAY NOT DEPEND UPON THE DISTRICT’S LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

The situation now in Washington, D.C. is that women can no longer depend upon the men in their lives to provide protection against violent crime, nor do women themselves have access to handguns that equalize the inherent biological differences between a woman victim and her most likely male attacker. The traditional emphasis of men’s duty to protect women not only increases this defenselessness, but in fact has proved of less worth as increasingly more women live alone. Women in the District have therefore been compelled to rely upon the protections of a government-provided police force.
Courts have found that such reliance is unfounded. See Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection from Crime, 90 A.L.R.5th 273 (2001). Despite women’s expectations, courts across the nation have ruled that the Due Process Clause does not “requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989). Women simply have no legal right to law enforcement protection unless they are able to prove special and highly narrow circumstances. Just how special and highly narrow those circumstances are were proven in this Court’s Castle Rock v. Gonzales decision. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). In Castle Rock, the Court found that a temporary restraining order, a mandatory arrest statute passed with the clear legislative intent of ensuring enforcement of domestic abuse restraining orders, and Jessica Gonzalez’s repeated pleas for help were insufficient for her to demand protection. Castle Rock therefore left open the question of just what a woman and a well-meaning legislature would have to do to create such a right to expect police protection from a known and specific threat.

There is no case that better illustrates both how little individual citizens may demand of their local police forces and the utility of a serviceable firearm than Washington, D.C.’s own Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1981). One morning two men broke down the door and climbed to the second floor of a home where a mother and her four-year-old daughter were sleeping. The men raped and sodomized the mother. Her screams awoke two women living upstairs, who phoned 911 and were assured that help would soon arrive. The neighbors then waited upon an adjoining roof while one policeman simply drove past the residence and another departed after receiving no response to his knock on the door. Believing the two men had fled, the women climbed back into the home and again heard their neighbor’s screams. Again they called the police. This second call was never even dispatched to officers.

After hearing no further screams, the two women trusted that police had indeed arrived and called down to their neighbor. Then alerted to the presence of two other victims nearby, the men proceeded to rape, beat, and compel all three women to sodomize each other for the next fourteen hours. Upon their seeking some compensation from the District for its indifference, the women were reminded that a government providing law enforcement services “assumes a duty only to the public at large and not to individual members of the community.” Id. at 4. The District thus simultaneously makes it impossible for women to protect themselves with a firearm while refusing to accept responsibility for their protection.

III. GENDER CHARACTERISTICS SHOULD AT LEAST BE CONSIDERED BEFORE BARRING LAW-ABIDING WOMEN HANDGUNS, THE MOST SUITABLE MEANS FOR THEIR SELF-PROTECTION

Women are at a severe disadvantage when confronting a likely stronger male assailant. In general, women simply do not have the upper body strength and testosterone-driven speed to effectively defend themselves without help.
A firearm, particularly an easily manipulable handgun, equalizes this strength differential and thereby provides women the best chance they have of thwarting an attacker. Even more statistically likely, a firearm in the hands of a threatened woman offers the deterrence empty hands and an often unavailing 911 call do not. E.g., Int’l L. Enf. Educ. & Trainers Assoc. Br. at section I.E. (noting that in 2003, Washington, D.C.’s average police response time for the highest-priority emergency calls was almost 8 and a half minutes). Even in cases in which a 911 response would be effective, an attacker in control of the situation will not allow a woman to pick up the phone to make that call.

Women have made such advances in equality under the law that it is altogether too easy to disregard the innate gender-based biological inequality when it comes to self-defense. Television provides countless examples of strong women standing toe-to-toe against male evildoers and emerging with only minor cuts and bruises. Our invariably gorgeous heroines manage to successfully defend themselves without so much as smudging their make-up or breaking a heel off their stilettos. Women with children are commonly depicted imploring their children to be silent until a caravan of police cars arrives with sirens blaring to finally arrest the assailant. Such images do not conform with most people’s experiences and do nothing to decrease the level of violence actual women often suffer.

Advocates of women’s reproductive choice commonly argue that pregnancy disproportionately affects women due to their innate gender-based characteristics. Thus, they argue, courts failing to recognize the right to terminate a pregnancy therefore discriminate against women and bar their ability to participate as equal and full members of civil society. While choices about pregnancy no doubt impact a woman’s ability to determine the course of part of her life, it is not clear why such a right should be due greater protection than a woman’s ability to defend her very existence. A woman who is murdered, a woman who is so badly injured that she may never recover emotionally and/or physically, and a woman who feels constantly helpless faces even greater barriers to her ability to function as an equal member of society.

Amicae therefore contend that depriving women of the right to possess a handgun in the privacy of their own homes reflects at best an insensitivity to women’s unique needs created by their inherent gender characteristics. A handgun simply is the best means of self-defense for those who generally lack the upper body strength to successfully wield a shotgun or other long gun. To therefore deny half the population a handgun, as the District and the Office of the Solicitor General urge, evinces the “blindness or indifference” to women that only perpetuates women’s vulnerability to physical subordination. . . .

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Although there is considerable overlap between the two assessments of the risks and dangers faced by women in our society, the briefs take very different views about how to combat those dangers. What explains the different assessments? Do these competing assessments simply reflect different estimates about the risks and utilities of firearms? If so, can this disagreement

2. Assume that the empirical case was convincing one way or the other. Is there a difference between measurements of the past and expectations about future events? Do you generally find empirical evidence convincing when making decisions about the future?

3. Assume you are a woman living in a high-crime neighborhood and are considering obtaining a firearm for self-protection. How much of your decision will be based on data about the risks and utilities of firearms? What other factors might influence your decision? What are the factors that should influence a personal decision to obtain a firearm? Are those the same factors that should influence public officials who set firearms policy?

4. Robin West argues that the failure of state and social institutions to protect women justifies the right to abortion. “To whatever degree we fail to create the minimal conditions for a just society, we also have a right, individually and fundamentally to be shielded from the most dire or simply the most damaging consequences of that failure. . . . We must have the right to opt out of an unjust patriarchal world that visits unequal but unparalleled harms upon women . . . with unwanted pregnancies.” Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion, 45 Hastings L.J. 961, 964, 965 (1994). Does that argument also support a woman’s claim of right to own a firearm for self-defense?

5. There is no doubt that an abused woman is at substantially greater risk if her abuser has a gun, as pointed out in the National Network brief. However, as noted in the Women State Legislators and Academics brief, research shows no statistically significant heightened risk to an abuse victim who both lives apart from her abuser and has her own gun. Living with armed abuser results in 7.59 odds ratio for increased risk of femicide, an odds ratio so high as to almost certainly be statistically valid. (In other words, a woman who lives with an armed abuser is about 750 percent more likely to be murdered than is a woman who lives with an unarmed abuser.) Jacqueline Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health 1089, 1090-92 (2003).

6. The brief of the Women State Legislators and Academics disclaims the position that only women should have a constitutional right to a handgun. However, could you construct an argument for such a position, using the data in the two briefs above? Laws that discriminate on the basis of sex are generally subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (This review sometimes comes close to strict scrutiny in practice. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (striking down a state military college’s single-sex admissions policy, and holding that an “exceedingly persuasive justification” was required before “gender-based government action” could be upheld).) If Heller had not recognized a right of individuals to own handguns, would it be constitutional for a city or state
to enact a law prohibiting men, but not women, from owning handguns? Are there any circumstances today where gender-based firearms legislation might be upheld against Second Amendment challenge, Fourteenth Amendment challenge, or both? Where it might be appropriate?

7. Does *Heller* represent a masculine or paternalistic view of guns and home defense? Jennifer Carlson and Kristin A. Goss argue that

[t]his centering of the Second Amendment on the home and the family provides a ripe context for men to stake their status as men. Contemporary gun culture often follows a familial prerogative that locates men’s rights and obligations to own, carry, and use guns in their social roles as fathers and husbands. This citizen-protector model of gun-oriented masculinity makes the political personal: Men’s obligations, rights, and duties associated with firearms are focused on their respective households and, to a lesser extent, on their communities. As men, particularly but not exclusively white conservative men, face socioeconomic insecurity and political and social threat, guns provide a means to a version of masculinity marked by dutiful protection and justified violence. As the New Right emphasizes a narrative about the state’s inadequacy in the public sphere and its illegitimacy in the private sphere, guns provide a space for men to practice and affirm their role in community and family protection.


C. Age and Physical Disability

People who are physically weaker than average may have heightened concerns about their physical security. The two briefs that follow reflect that concern but take different views about the effectiveness of gun control and the utility of private firearms.


ARGUMENT

I. HANDGUNS POSE A UNIQUE DANGER TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH


Handguns, however, pose a particular risk to children and adolescents. When a gun is carried outside the home by a high school-aged youth, it is most likely to be a semiautomatic handgun (50 percent) and next most likely to be a revolver (30 percent). Josh Sugarmann, *Every Handgun Is Aimed at You: The Case for Banning Handguns* 113 (2001) (citing Joseph F. Sheley & James D. Wright, *High School Youths, Weapons, and Violence: A National Survey* 6 (1998)). Further, there is no way to make guns “safe” for children—gun safety programs have little effect in reducing firearms death and injury. *Id.* at 125. Death and injury to America’s children and youth is undeniably linked to the presence and availability of handguns, as discussed further below.

A. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HANDGUN LAW IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION BECAUSE HANDGUNS MAKE SUICIDE MORE LIKELY AND SUICIDE-ATTEMPTS MORE INJURIOUS TO CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

Access to firearms, and handguns in particular, increases the risk that children will die in a firearm-related suicide. In 1997, 1,262 children committed suicide using a firearm, and 63 percent of all suicides in adolescents 15 through
19 years of age were committed with a firearm. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Inj. & Poison Prevention, [Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 105 Pediatrics 888,] 889-90 Fig. 1 [(Apr. 2000)]. In 1996, handguns were involved in 70 percent of teenage suicides in which a firearm was used. Id. at 889.

Case studies reveal that suicide by firearm is strongly associated with the presence of a gun in the home of the victim. See generally David A. Brent et al., Firearms and Adolescent Suicide, 147 Am. J. of Diseases of Child. 1066 (1993); Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 467 (1992). In fact, the risk of suicide is five times greater in households with guns. Brent, supra, at 1068. A study on adolescent suicide and firearms found that while 87.8 percent of suicide victims who lived in a home with a gun died by firearms, only 18.8 percent of suicide victims that did not have a gun died by firearms. Id. Even more telling is that homes with handguns have a risk of suicide almost twice as high as that in homes containing only long guns. Kellermann, supra, at 470.

Moreover, statistics reveal that restrictions on access to handguns in the District of Columbia significantly reduced the incidence of suicide by firearms and resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of deaths by suicide. Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 1615, 1617 (1991). A study by the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of Maryland showed a decline of 25 percent in the number of suicides by firearms in the District of Columbia from 1968 to 1987. Id. at 1616 tbl. 1. Tellingly, the number of non-firearm-related suicides in the District of Columbia during that same time frame did not decline; nor did the number of firearm-related suicides in neighboring communities that were not subject to a similar ban on handguns. Id. at 1617-18. Additionally, the reduction in the number of suicides by firearms in the District during this time did not result in a corresponding increase in the incidents of suicides by other means. See id. at 1619. Thus, researchers concluded from the study that “restrictions on access to guns in the District of Columbia prevented an average of 47 deaths each year after the law was implemented.” Id.

In addition, between 2000 and 2002, no child under the age of 16 died from suicide by firearm in the District of Columbia. In contrast, states without handgun bans (and less restrictive guns laws generally), such as Alaska, Montana and Idaho, led the country with 14, 15, and 15, respectively, firearm suicide deaths, respectively, in the same population in the same time period. Violence Pol’y Ctr., Press Release, New Study Shows District of Columbia’s Tough Gun Laws Work to Prevent Youth Suicide—No Child 16 Years of Age or Younger in DC Was the Victim of Firearm Suicide According to Most Recent Federal Data (July 12, 2005). Given that in 2003, the third leading cause of death nationwide among youth aged ten to twenty-four was suicide and that the risk of suicide is five times greater in homes with guns, invalidation of the law will almost certainly increase the number of children that die from a suicide. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat’l Vital Statistics Sys., Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States–2003.
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S HANDGUN LAW IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION BECAUSE HANDGUNS INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD AND DEADLINESS OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING CHILDREN

The increased accessibility to handguns that will result if the District of Columbia handgun ban is struck down will increase the number of children who will be harmed in accidents involving firearms. Studies have shown that fewer than half of United States families with both firearms and children secure firearms separate from ammunition. See, e.g., Mark A. Schuster et al., *Firearm Storage Patterns in U.S. Homes with Children*, 90 Am. J. of Pub. Health 588, 590-91 (2000). This practice is especially troubling because children as young as three are able to pull the trigger of most handguns. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Comm. on Inj. & Poison Prevention, *supra*, at 890. Approximately 70 percent of all unintentional firearm injuries and deaths are a result of handguns. *Id.* at 888.

Unintentional firearm death disproportionately affects children: In 2004, firearms accounted for 27 percent of the unintentional deaths in 2004 among youth aged 10-19, while accounting for only 22 percent of unintentional deaths among the population as a whole. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, WISQARS database. Additionally, each year nearly 90 children are killed and approximately 1,400 are treated in hospital emergency rooms for unintentional firearm-related injuries. SAFE KIDS USA, Press Release, *Unintentional Shooting Prompts SAFE KIDS to Issue Warning About Dangers of Guns in the Home* (2003). Most of these deaths occur in or around the home, and most involve guns that are loaded and accessible to children. *Id.*

The more guns a jurisdiction has, the more likely children in that jurisdiction will die from a firearm accident. In a study of accidental firearm deaths that occurred between 1979 and 1999, children aged four and under were 17 times more likely to die from a gun accident in the four states with the most guns versus the four states with the fewest guns. Matthew Miller et al., *Firearm Availability and Unintentional Firearm Deaths*, 333 Accident Analysis & Prevention 477, 481 Table 3 (2001). Thus, if the decision to strike the handgun ban in the District of Columbia is not reversed, the number of children who will die or be injured by handguns accidentally will increase significantly.

C. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HANDGUN LAW IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION BECAUSE FIREARMS AND ESPECIALLY HANDGUNS INCREASE HOMICIDE AND NONFATAL ASSAULT RATES AMONG AMERICA’S YOUTH


Moreover, nationally, children and young adults are killed by firearms more frequently than almost any other cause of death. In 2004, firearm homicide was the second leading cause of injury death for persons 10 to 24 years of age, second only to motor vehicle crashes. Brady Campaign Publication, *Firearm Facts* (Apr. 2007). Incredibly, in that same year, firearm homicide—not car accidents—was the leading cause of death for African American males between the ages of 15 and 34. *Id.* Children and youth are murdered with handguns more often than all other weapons combined. Violence Pol’y Ctr., *Kids in the Line of Fire: Children, Handguns, and Homicide*. And, for every child killed by a gun, four are wounded. Diane [sic] Degette, *When the Unthinkable Becomes Routine*, 77 Denv. U. L. Rev. 615, 615 n.5 (2000).

Finally, firearms (particularly handguns) represent the leading weapon utilized by both children and adults in the commission of homicide. See Fox Butterfield, *Guns Blamed for Rise in Homicides by Youths in the 80’s*, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1998, at 29. Between 1985 and 2002, the firearm homicide death rate increased 36 percent for teens aged 15 to 19 nationwide. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, WISQARS database. Not coincidentally, in each year after 1985, handguns have been the most used homicide weapon by juveniles (those age 17 and under) nationwide. Alfred Blumstein, *Youth, Guns, and Violent Crime*, 12 The Future of Children 39, at Fig. 5 (2002). Scholars note that the dramatic increases in the rate of homicide committed by juveniles are attributable largely to the increases in homicides in which a firearm is used. Alan Lizotte, *Guns & Violence: Patterns of Illegal Gun Carrying Among Young Urban Males*, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 375, 375 (1998). University of California, Berkeley law professor Frank Zimring has observed, “the most important reason for the sharp escalation in homicide [among offenders 13 to 17] was an escalating volume of fatal attacks with firearms.” Franklin E. Zimring, *American Youth Violence* 35-36 (1998).

Handgun bans alleviate the problem of firearm homicide. Researchers at the Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of Maryland found that gun-related homicides in the District of Columbia dropped 25 percent after the enactment of the ban. Loftin et al., *supra*, at 1616 Table 1. In addition, the relatively low incidence of gun-related violence in America’s schools proves that gun bans work. Thanks to the absolute prohibition of guns on the nation’s elementary and secondary school campuses, fewer than one percent of school-aged homicide victims are killed on or around school grounds or on

II. THE DISTRICT’S HANDGUN LAW IS A REASONABLE RESTRICTION BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC, SOCIETAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF HANDGUN VIOLENCE UPON CHILDREN

As discussed above, handguns are directly responsible for increasing the number of deaths and injuries to children and families from violent crime, suicide and accidents. The most serious harm resulting from youth violence is caused by firearms; most firearm-related injuries, in turn, involve handguns.

The economic, societal and psychological costs of youth violence also are well established. According to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention statistics, the consequences of youth violence include:

Direct and indirect costs of youth violence (e.g., medical, lost productivity, quality of life) in excess of $158 billion every year. . . .

In a nationwide survey of high school students, about six percent reported not going to school on one or more days in the 30 days preceding the survey because they felt unsafe at school or on their way to and from school. . . .

In addition to causing injury and death, youth violence affects communities by increasing the cost of health care, reducing productivity, decreasing property values, and disrupting social services. . . .

The public bears the majority of these costs. A recent study found that, in 2000, the average cost for each: (i) homicide was $4,906 in medical costs, and $1.3 million in lost productivity; (ii) non-fatal assault resulting in hospitalization was $24,353 in medical costs and $57,209 in lost productivity; (iii) suicide was $2,596 in medical costs and $1 million lost productivity; and (iv) non-fatal self inflicted injury was $7,234 in medical costs and $9,726 in lost productivity. Phaedra S. Corso et al., *Medical Costs and Productivity Losses Due to Interpersonal Violence and Self-Directed Violence*, 32 Am. J. of Preventive Med. 474 (2007). . . .

Economic costs provide, at best, an incomplete measure of the toll of violence and injuries caused by handguns. Children, like all victims of violence, are more likely to experience a broad range of mental and physical health problems not reflected in these estimates from post-traumatic stress disorder to depression, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes. *See generally* Corso et al., *supra*; Carole Goguen, *The Effects of Community Violence on Children and Adolescents*, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Nat’l Ctr. for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
Advocating on behalf of women, the elderly and the physically disabled, the amici herein argue the actions of the District of Columbia have harmed the members of society most physically vulnerable to criminal attack.

ARGUMENT

I. THE BRIEF’S STRUCTURE

One anomaly uncovered in approaching this issue from the viewpoint of women, the elderly and the physically disabled is that not all of these groups are equally represented in the literature. Studies referencing women are more prevalent. However, what is apparent from the anecdotal examples presented with this brief are the groups’ members’ characteristics for this discussion overlap to a great degree. Arguments asserted on behalf of women can be made, by analogy, on behalf of the members of the other two groups. This reinforces the main theme that all three groups’ members occupy a physically inferior position relative to their potential attackers and benefit from defensive use of handguns.


A. EMPirical RESEARCH SUPPORTS THE COMMON SENSE ARGUMENT THAT THE USE OF HANDGUNS PROTECTS WOMEN, THE ELDerLY AND THE PHYSICALLY DISABLED FROM GREATER PHYSICAL THREAT

It is well-recognized that the disparity in size and strength between men and women generally provides men with an advantage during physical combat. In her note Why Annie Can’t Get Her Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment, Inge Anna Larish supported this general statement with the following:

On average women are weaker than men of comparable height. Muscles form a lower proportion of female body weight than of male body weight (36% and 43%, respectively). Kenneth F. Dyer, Challenging the Men: The Social Biology of Female Sporting Achievement 71-72 (1982). Women can develop arm muscles only 75% to 85% the strength of men’s muscles. Generally, actual differences in average strength tend to be greater because women do not exercise their upper bodies adequately to develop their potential strength while men are more likely to engage in vigorous exercise to develop strength closer to their potential. Id. Men also have more power available for explosive events than women. Id. at 74.
Women are on average smaller than men. The average height of men in the United States ranges from 5’ 7.4” to 5’ 9.7” and from 163 to 178 pounds; the average height for women ranges from 5’ 2.2” to 5’ 4.3” and from 134 to 150 pounds. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 108 (107th ed. 1987).


In light of the differences, Larish concludes the possession of a gun not only serves to “equalize the differences between men . . . ,” but also serves to “eliminate the disparity in physical power between the sexes.” Id. Furthermore, she posits, “The available information on civilian restriction of gun ownership indicates that one of the groups most harmed by restrictions on private gun ownership will be women.” Id. (emphasis added). Larish further states, “Analysts repeatedly find that guns are the surest and safest method of protection for those who are most vulnerable to ‘vicious male predators.’ Guns are thus the most effective self-defense tools for women, the elderly, the weak, the infirm and the physically handicapped.” Id. 498 (citing Edgar A. Suter, Guns in the Medical Literature—A Failure of Peer Review, 83 J. Med. Ass’n Ga. 133, 140 (1994)). . . .

According to Dr. Kleck’s findings, firearms are used defensively 2.2 to 2.5 million times a year, with handguns accounting for 1.5 to 1.9 million of the instances. Kleck and Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self Defense with a Gun, J. Crim. L. and Criminology, Vol. 86, No. 1, 164 (1995) (emphasis added). Of the sample used to calculate the number of times a gun was used defensively during a year, women made up 46 percent. Id. at 178. Of the 2 million defensive gun uses each year, 8.2 percent involved sexual assault. This translates to approximately 205,000 occurrences each year. Id. at 185. In addition, overall, with a handgun, the odds in favor of reducing serious injury to the victim increase. Tark and Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the Outcomes of Crimes, Criminology, Vol. 42, No. 4, 861-909, 902 (November 2004).

The empirical literature is unanimous in portraying defensive handgun use as effective, in the sense that gun-wielding victims are less likely to be injured, lose property, or otherwise have crimes completed against them than victims who either do nothing, resist or who resist without weapons. Kleck and Gertz, Carrying Guns for Protection: Results from the National Self-Defense Survey, J. Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 35, No. 2, 193, 194 (May 1998). . . .

**B. THE AMICI CURIAE BRIEF FILED BY VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS INCORRECTLY CHARACTERIZES THE VALUE OF THE HANDGUN AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE**

On pages 29-31 of the brief submitted in this case by Violence Policy Center [hereinafter VPC], it argues that handgun use is the least effective method for self-defense and that shotguns and rifles are better suited for this purpose. Brief for Violence Policy Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 29-31, District of Columbia, et al. v. Dick Anthony Heller, No. 07-290 (January 11, 2008). VPC further states that this argument is supported by a “wealth of evidence.” Id. at 30.
The problem with this contention is VPC fails to cite any evidence supporting its proposition. Moreover, for women, the elderly and the physically disabled, VPC’s “one-size-fits-all” approach ignores the physical requirements necessary to use shotguns or other long guns. Finally, the argument disregards the obvious: a handgun’s compact nature lends itself to easier use by individuals with lesser physical ability, including but not limited to persons who are unable to brandish a shotgun when threatened.

VPC cites to “[f]irearms expert” Chris Bird, quoting from his book *The Concealed Handgun Manual, How to Choose, Carry and Shoot a Gun in Self Defense* in support of its assertion that the “handgun is the least effective firearm for self defense.” The absurdity of pretending a book advocating the use of handguns really contains the opposite conclusion does not go unnoticed. The quote used by VPC, “a handgun ‘is the least effective firearm for self defense’ and in almost all situations ‘shotguns and rifles are much more effective in stopping a [criminal],’” however will be examined. The quote is drawn from *Chapter 5, Choosing a Handgun: Semi-automatics and Revolvers* and reads in its entirety:

Like many things in life, a handgun is a compromise. It is the least effective firearm for self-defense. Except at very close quarters—at arm’s length—shotguns and rifles are much more effective in stopping a drug-hyped robber or rapist intent on making you pay for his lack of social skills. A handgun is the hardest firearm to shoot accurately, and, even when you hit what you are shooting at, your target does not vaporize in a red mist like on television.

*Id.* at 114.

Contrary to VPC’s assertion, Bird’s point is not that handguns are ineffective, but their effectiveness depends on the ammunition’s stopping power. He states in the same section:

In choosing a handgun for self defense, remember that the gun has two functions. In some cases, presentation of the gun, coupled with a shouted order to “STOP, GO AWAY, BACK UP,” will be enough, to diffuse the threat. It reminds the potential robber or rapist he has urgent business in another county. . . . While any handgun will do, a large gun with a hole in the business end as big as a howitzer reinforces the seriousness of your intentions.

In cases where the threat is not enough, the gun is a delivery system for those little missiles, scarcely bigger than a cigarette filter, that rip and tear your attacker’s anatomy. It is the bullet that stops the attack, not the gun. The size and weight of the bullet depend mostly on the caliber of the gun from which it is fired. So one of your first decisions on picking a gun is deciding on a caliber.

*Id.* at 115.

None of this material, nor the balance of Bird’s book, supports VPC’s assertion that handguns are ineffective to deter crime or as a means of self-defense.

Moreover, VPC fails to support its additional argument that handguns are hard to shoot accurately because when characterized correctly, the cited work by noted firearms instructor Massad Ayoob, *In the Gravest Extreme, The Role of the Firearm in Personal Protection*, is contrary to VPC’s contention. First, the section of Ayoob’s book to which VPC refers has nothing to do with personal defense of the individual or the homeowner; instead, the quote comes from *Chapter 6, How*
and When to Use Firearms in Your Store. Id. at 43. Thus, this section is concerned with the proficiency of handgun use to avoid “wild shots” in order to avoid endangering customers or other persons. Id. at 47. Individual defense of the person and deterrence are treated in other chapters. Id. at 51, 75.

Second, the “accuracy” argument ignores that a criminal encounter is not a target shoot or practice. Moreover, it ignores a handgun’s deterrent effect. Ayoob corrects, qualifies and explains VPC’s mischaracterization of his statements in his declaration. He attests that:

The statements in question in the VPC brief glaringly ignore the well-established fact that the great majority of times when a private citizen draws a gun on a criminal suspect, the very presence of the gun suffices to end hostilities with no shots fired. This simple fact makes marksmanship skill under stress a moot point in the majority of instances when defensive firearms are brought into action by private citizens acting in defense of themselves or others.

See Declaration of Massad F. Ayoob infra p. App. 4.

Further, Ayoob observes, from a practical standpoint the use of a handgun, as opposed to a long gun, is superior in that long guns are more easily taken away during defensive use. He states:

The VPC brief falsely attributes its imputation that rifles and shotguns are superior to handguns for defensive purposes, to me among others. Yet in going through “In the Gravest Extreme” carefully enough to cherry-pick the misleading out-of-context quotes, that brief pointedly ignores my flat statements on Page 100 of the book in question: “High powered rifles are not recommended for self-defense. . . . A major problem with any rifle or shotgun is that it is too awkward to get into action quickly, or to handle in close quarters. A burglar will find it much easier to get a 3 foot weapon away from you, than a pistol you can hold and fire with one hand.” This is especially true with regard to any person who may be at a physical disadvantage when contrasted with the physical ability of their attacker, such as a woman, an elderly person or someone who is physically disabled.

Id. at pp. App. 4-5.

In addition, VPC’s argument fails to acknowledge the logical proposition that one may dial 911 when holding a handgun, but it is difficult to do so with two hands occupied with a long gun. . . .


Although statistics and empirical data are critical to understanding the broad spectrum of what defensive gun use means to society, the actual flesh-and-blood people, who have had to defend themselves or their families with handguns or other firearms, stand behind the data.
A printed compilation of the instances when women, the elderly or physically disabled defensively used guns in the United States would be unwieldy (though compelling), so the efficacy of statistics is obvious. Behind the rows and columns of data analyzed as statistics, however, are the faces of real, frightened and vulnerable people who have reached for their handguns after hearing the sounds of intruders in the night. These individuals, discussed below, avoided injury or death because they resisted their attackers with handguns. But, sadly, the same may not have been true if their homes were in the District of Columbia.


The following includes instances where women, the elderly and the physically disabled defended themselves during home invasions as well as attacks outside the home. The attacks were perpetrated by younger, stronger assailants. Moreover, the victims in some instances protected not only themselves, but also loved ones.

The anecdotes are arranged in reverse chronological order and by type. The home invasions come first, followed by parking lot incidents.

1. Home Invasions

On January 25, 2008 in Atlanta, Georgia, an intruder assaulted a wheelchair-bound homeowner at the homeowner’s front door. During the struggle, the homeowner was able to use his handgun to shoot the attacker.

In December 2007, there were numerous instances of home invasion attacks on women and the elderly. On December 14, 2007 in Lexington, Kentucky, two women were inside their home when they heard a man trying to break in. They dialed 911, keeping the dispatcher on the phone while they warned the man to stop. When he would not stop, one of the women shot him. Investigators ruled the shooting self-defense.

On December 8, 2007 at Hialeah Gardens, Florida, four armed men attacked a 74-year-old heart patient, Jorge Leonton, in his driveway. After he withdrew money from an ATM, the four followed him home and choked him after he got out of the car, demanding money. While being choked by one of the attackers, Leonton took out his gun, for which he had a concealed weapon permit, and told the attacker three times he had a heart condition, could not breathe and the assailant was killing him. When the attacker would not let go, Leonton shot him. The other three men fled. Leonton’s wife said, “If he wouldn’t have been armed, I think he would have been killed.” . . .

In November 2007, there were several attacks against all groups’ members. On November 27, 2007 in Carthage, Missouri, a 63-year-old grandmother brandishing a handgun caused two burglars to run away after they broke down her back door. Her grandchild was in the house at the time.
Two weeks earlier, on November 16, 2007 in Waynesville, Missouri, a disabled man chased one intruder away and took one prisoner for the police with his handgun. Before breaking into the disabled man’s trailer, the two male assailants had broken into a local motel room where they had beaten two people with a baseball bat so severely that one had to be taken by “life flight” to the hospital. Later, the two intruders entered the trailer and confronted the disabled man and his wife. One intruder pulled a pellet gun, but the homeowner pulled a “real gun.” The pellet gun-wielding intruder fled while the other was held until the police arrived.

Two days earlier, on November 14, 2007 in Hessville, Indiana, a woman who was being stalked had her door kicked in by a former date. Later, when he returned to her home, she called 911 and was told to lock herself in the bedroom. When she retreated to the bedroom, she found a pistol which had been given to her for protection. She hid in a closet, the stalker opened the door, she told him to stop, but when he advanced toward her, she fired three times. She struck the stalker in the abdomen and he died from his wounds.

On November 5, 2007 in Bartlett, Tennessee, Dorothy “Bobbi” Lovell’s charges were dropped after a review of the evidence indicated self-defense in the shooting of her husband. Mrs. Lovell shot her husband with a .357-caliber magnum handgun after he held Mrs. Lovell and her 21-year-old son hostage, threatening their lives.

October 2007 was replete with the defensive use of handguns. On October 27, 2007 in Gainesville, Florida, a 28-year-old male tried to kick down the door of a home owned by Arthur Williams, a 75-year-old, legally blind, retired taxi dispatcher. The homeowner fired on the intruder, striking him in the neck. Local officials praised Williams for defending himself. On October 24, 2007 in Wichita, Kansas, a 76-year-old man shot his 52-year-old live-in girlfriend after she poured bleach on him, sprayed him with mace and beat him with a frying pan. The police called the use of the weapon self-defense. On October 15, 2007 in Kansas City, Missouri, a 69-year-old man thwarted a home invasion by firing a shot from his .40-caliber handgun at his bedroom door when he heard an intruder approaching after his front door had been pried open. The intruder fled without apparent injury.

In July 2007, there were several reported attacks against the elderly and the disabled. On July 30, 2007 in Limestone County, Alabama, a disabled man who collected aluminum cans to supplement his income confronted two men, ages 20 and 24, stealing his cans. He immediately called the sheriff’s office. The men thought he had left, walked back onto the property and, when they discovered him in his truck, one of them came toward the homeowner and threatened him. The homeowner told him to stop. When he did not, the homeowner showed his gun and demanded the two men lie on the ground to wait for the sheriff. On July 27, 2007 in El Dorado, Arkansas, a 24-year-old intruder beat 93-year-old Mr. Hill with a soda can, striking him 50 times before he passed out. Covered with blood, the elderly man awoke and retrieved a .38-caliber handgun. The assailant charged at him, forcing Hill to shoot him in the throat. Police arrived and took both Hill and the intruder to the hospital. On July 4, 2007 in Hickory, North Carolina, a 79-year-old man shot a 23-year-old intruder in his bedroom. After the intruder broke into the house, the homeowner’s wife escaped to the neighbors and the homeowner shot the intruder. The intruder was expected to survive.
On April 26, 2007 in Augusta, Georgia, an assailant awakened his 57-year-old neighbor, Theresa Wachowiak, putting a knife to her throat. She resisted and managed to grab her .357-caliber handgun, and she shot the intruder in the stomach. The intruder survived.

2006 saw notable examples of defensive gun use. On December 2, 2006 in Zion, Illinois, a 55-year-old wife heard her kitchen doorjamb shatter. She grabbed her pistol and shot the intruder in the chest after he forced his way into her house. The intruder was wearing a black ski mask and gloves.

On October 18, 2006 in Santa Clarita, California, an intruder broke the lock on Nadine Teter’s back door and barged into her home. She fled to her backyard with a gun, but he followed and charged at her. She shot him. The intruder fell, got back up and advanced again, requiring her to shoot him two more times. The attacker then jumped over a fence and ran away. He was later apprehended when the intruder’s mother, who was driving the “get-away” car, flagged down law enforcement for medical attention. The intruder survived, and he and his mother were convicted in December 2007 of charges arising out of the attack. With regard to the use of the firearm, Teter said she thinks every woman should carry a gun. She also said:

> Never in a million years, did I think I would use (the gun)—never. And whatever higher power, whatever gave me the strength to pull that trigger. . . . You’re looking at him or me. My life or his life. I was not going to get raped. I was not going to get murdered. There was no way—and I didn’t.

On April 27, 2006 in Red Bank, Tennessee, at 1:30 a.m., a disabled man saw a masked man crawling through his bedroom window. After he was awakened by the window breaking, David McCutcheon, the disabled homeowner, reached for his .32-caliber revolver and fired four times, forcing the masked man to flee. The intruder was arrested.

2005 saw attacks on the elderly thwarted by defensive handgun use. On May 31, 2005 in Indialantic, Florida, Ms. Judith Kuntz, a 64-year-old widow armed with a .38-caliber revolver shot an intruder in the chest after he broke into her home. She fired at him as he entered her bedroom with a flashlight. She stated, “I’m doing fine under the circumstances. . . . I don’t take any joy in somebody being dead. My self-preservation instinct took over.” See Declaration of Judith Kuntz infra pp. App. 19-20. On March 30, 2005 in Kingsport, Tennessee, an 83-year-old woman wrestled with a home intruder. Although he left with her purse, she was able to fire her handgun at him during the struggle, causing him to flee.

Women and the elderly used handguns to stave off assailants in 2004. On March 22, 2004 in Springfield, Ohio, 49-year-old Melanie Yancey shot and killed a 21-year-old intruder when he and an accomplice broke into her home after kicking in her door. She sealed herself in her bedroom, but the two tried to break in. She then fired a shot at them from her .40-caliber handgun and they returned fire. When she heard them go into another unoccupied bedroom, she ran out of the room and fired at them as she ran out of the house. Later, one of the intruders was found lying on a nearby driveway.

On November 4, 2004 in Pensacola, Florida, a 77-year-old retired oil worker, James Workman, shot an intruder who entered the trailer where Workman...
and his wife, Kathryn, were at home. The intruder advanced toward the trailer despite a warning shot, and Workman struggled with the intruder inside the trailer, shooting him in the process.

2. Parking Lot Incidents

On December 27, 2007 in Orlando, Florida, a 65-year-old man fought off five thugs with a handgun. He was collecting money for parking at a church when a man, accompanied by four other men, put a gun to his head. The victim reached inside his jacket as if to pull out money, but instead, pulled out a handgun and started firing. The men ran away. The elderly man reported he obtained a concealed weapon permit after he was previously attacked by eight teens who tried to rob him with a pipe.

On July 1, 2007 in Dallas, Texas, a 31-year-old man stopped Amor Kerboua, a 79-year-old man, in Kerboua’s apartment parking lot. The man put a gun in Kerboua’s face and demanded money. Thinking the attacker was joking, Kerboua pushed the gun away. Again, the man put the gun in his face and Kerboua handed him a cup containing $242.50. The assailant then told Kerboua he was going to kill him, pointing the gun at his stomach. Instead, Kerboua, who had a concealed weapon permit, drew his .38-caliber revolver and shot the assailant in the throat. The assailant fell, but maintained his gun aim at Kerboua, forcing Kerboua to fire two more times. The police determined Kerboua acted in self-defense. The assailant survived.


2. Minnie Lee Faulkner: A Modern Illustration That the Use of a Firearm Deters an Attacker

. . . Mrs. Minnie Lee Faulkner, 88, lives alone in her home in Elbert County, Georgia near the Savannah River. Elbert County is still rural though settled early in the State’s history. Faulkner purchased a handgun for personal defense and home protection after the death of her husband in 1993. Faulkner chose a handgun over a rifle or shotgun because it was small, maneuverable and easy to use for home defense by someone of her age, size and strength.

On October 10, 2004, Faulkner’s doorbell rang at one o’clock in the morning. From the porch, a voice called, “Minnie Lee, I’ve got car trouble—open the door.” Faulkner replied that she was not going to open the door, and the man on her porch started kicking the door. He split the door and Faulkner called 911.

Faulkner told the man that she had called 911 and he stopped kicking. With pistol in hand, Faulkner then peered out the window and she saw a young man’s face with a clear complexion. Faulkner said in a stout voice, “I have my gun and I have it trained right on you.” The intruder left. Later, when the front door was examined, it was determined that one more kick would have broken the door. Later that night, the intruder broke into a nearby trailer and attacked
an elderly woman while she was in bed. Faulkner believes that the intruder would have tried to kill her had he entered.

Faulkner spoke with the local sheriff’s office and was able to provide information for a composite drawing, identifying the intruder as the son of a deceased neighbor. Faulkner specifically noted his clear eyes and good complexion. Using this information and other evidence, the sheriff’s office was able to apprehend the intruder. He was convicted of burglary and aggravated assault with intent to rape.

Faulkner was badly frightened by the attack. She believes that her handgun is her only protection, and she is glad she had it the night of the attack. She did not have to shoot the intruder because the mere presence of the weapon scared him away. Faulkner believes people have a right to have a gun for protection and self-defense.

Faulkner’s experience poignantly illustrates why the individual right of self-defense through the use of a handgun is so vital to women, the elderly and the physically disabled. Faulkner is from the same county where Nancy Hart stood against the Tories during the War for Independence. As Hart used her intelligence, courage and the Tories’ own rifles against them, Faulkner used her courage, fortitude and handgun against an intruder in the night. These women, though separated by two hundred thirty years, have in common the necessity of firearms to deter their bigger, stronger or more numerous assailants. Without firearms, both Nancy Hart and Minnie Lee Faulkner, living on the same land but separated by time, would have been victims. With firearms, they became more than equal to the imminent danger they faced.

DECLARATION OF JUDITH KUNTZ . . .

2. I am a 67-year-old widow and live in Indialantic, Florida.

3. I own a .38-caliber handgun for personal defense. I believe my ownership of the gun and the use of it for personal defense saved my life. I chose a handgun over a rifle or shotgun because it is small, maneuverable and easy to use. I did not choose the rifle or shotgun because they are heavy, unwieldy and difficult to use in a confined space such as my home.

4. On May 31, 2005, I shot an intruder who unlawfully entered my home. I attempted to hide from the intruder in my bedroom, but the intruder proceeded to enter my bedroom while I was in it. I shot the intruder in order to protect myself and my property.

5. I am glad I had my handgun during the incident and that I was able to defend myself and my property, I believe people have a right to own and use a gun for personal defense.

DECLARATION OF THERESA WACHOWIAK . . .

2. I am 57-years-old, and I live in Augusta, Georgia.

3. I own a .357-caliber handgun for personal defense. I believe my ownership of this gun and the use of it for personal defense saved my life. I defer to a handgun over a rifle or shotgun because it is small, maneuverable and easy to use. I did not choose the rifle or shotgun because they are heavy, unwieldy and difficult to use in a confined space such as my home if an intruder actually entered.

4. On April 26, 2007, an intruder gained entrance into my house, in the early morning hours, woke me up, and put a knife to my throat with the
intent of doing me bodily harm. He was in my bed and unaware of the handgun I kept in my bed stand. I protested against his covering my mouth with his hand as he pressed his knife to my throat repeatedly, threatening to kill me as I was struggling to remove his hand. This interaction provided me an opportunity to keep his focus on my resistance while I secured my handgun with his being unaware of my other activities. I appeared to comply finally with his “being in control” and ceased struggling upon securing my weapon. I asked him what did he want. Simultaneously, he realized there were dogs in the room and demanded I “get the dogs out.” With him at my back and his knife still ready, we moved off of my bed to the bedroom door. When at the dog gate he demanded the dogs be removed from the room, I unfastened the dog gate and with him preoccupied with their imminent release I pivoted and shot him in the right side of his chest. I did not randomly exercise force, only sufficient force to remove him as a personal threat. He was still mobile and anxious to get away through the now opened dog gate. I called the police and secured medical help for him as I did not expect he could get very far. He did survive his single wound. I was saddened and shocked to find out that the man was a neighbor and a relative of a family I cared about and had known for decades.

5. I am glad I had my handgun that morning and was able to defend myself and my property. I would be no match in a physical contest of strength with my assailant and would have just been another sad statistic. My handgun was the tool I used to preserve my life. . . .

DECLARATION OF JAMES H. WORKMAN, JR. . . .

2. I am 80-years-old, a retired oil industry worker and I live with my wife Kathryn in Pensacola, Florida.

3. I own a .38-caliber handgun for personal defense. I believe my ownership of the gun and the use of it for personal defense saved my wife Kathryn’s life and mine. I chose a handgun over a rifle or shotgun because it is small, maneuverable and easy to use. I did not choose the rifle or shotgun because they are heavy, unwieldy and difficult to use in a confined space such as my home if an intruder actually entered.

4. On November 4, 2004, I shot an intruder who entered the trailer where my wife and I were staying. We were living in a trailer in front of our home that was damaged by Hurricane Ivan. When the intruder entered our yard at 2:20 A.M., I confronted him. Despite my firing a warning shot into the ground, the intruder advanced toward the trailer. I struggled with him inside the trailer, shooting him in the process.

5. I am glad I had my handgun that night and was able to defend my wife, myself and our property. I believe people have a right to own and use a gun for personal defense. . . .

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Were you surprised by the data about firearms suicide in the American Academy of Pediatrics brief? In general, suicide attempts with firearms
are more likely to succeed than attempts involving most other common methods such as drowning, cutting, or asphyxiation. Suicide rates differ widely from state to state. The demographic group most likely to commit suicide, particularly with firearms, is elderly white men. While rural states such as Alaska and Montana tend to have high suicide rates, the District of Columbia has traditionally had one of the lowest suicide rates in the nation. Scholars are nearly unanimous that greater firearms prevalence is associated with greater percentage of suicides being committed with firearms. Indeed, the “percent of suicide with guns” (PSG) is perhaps the best proxy for total gun ownership in a community. However, scholars disagree about whether firearms density increases the overall suicide rate, or merely changes the method, since some other forms of self-inflicted harm (e.g., hanging, jumping from a height) are nearly as lethal. Compare Harvard School of Public Health, Firearm Access Is a Risk Factor for Suicide, with Gary Kleck, The Effect of Firearms in Suicide, in Gun Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Politics, Policy, and Practice 309 (Jennifer Carlson, Kristin A. Goss & Harel Shapira eds. 2019).

2. International data further complicate the picture. The age-standardized U.S. suicide rate in 2016 was 13.7 per 100,000 population (21.1 male and 6.4 female). The global average was 10.5. Since no country matches the gun density of the United States, there are many examples of nations that have fewer guns and a suicide rate that is higher than the United States, about the same as the United States, or lower. See World Health Organization, Suicide rates (per 100 000 population). If gun prevalence does make suicide more common among all or some groups, then how should this be taken into account in debates about gun policy? Is suicide as harmful or immoral as unlawful homicide? Are all suicides wrong? Are some worse than others? What public policy distinctions are appropriate in this area?

3. Does advocacy of firearms bans give sufficient attention to beneficial gun use like those described in the Southeastern Legal Foundation amicus brief?

4. What type of laws and regulatory system would eliminate the need for guns in cases like those described in the “Declarations” of Southeastern Legal Foundation brief?

5. Are the stories in the amicus “Declarations” examples of good results? Would disarming people like Judith Kuntz be an acceptable cost of strict gun laws with the expectation of a net benefit to the community overall?

6. Do these personal episodes affect your view of optimal firearms policy? Do they affect your view about whether to own a firearm? Does the answer to one question influence the other?

7. As detailed in the American Academy of Pediatrics amicus brief, an article in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that the D.C. handgun ban had significantly reduced homicide and suicide. The conclusion was
strongly disputed in an amicus brief of Criminologists and the Claremont Institute:

Over the five pre-ban years the murder rate fell from 37 to 27 per 100,000 population. . . . In the five post-ban years the murder rate rose to 35. . . . Averaging the rates over the 40 years surrounding the bans yields a pre-ban DC rate (1960-76) of 24.6 murders. The average for the post-ban years is nearly double: 47.4 murders per 100,000 population. The year before the bans (1976), the District’s murder rate was 27 per 100,000 population; after 15 years under the bans it had tripled to 80.22 per 100,000 (1991). . . .

After the gun prohibitions, the District became known as the “murder capital” of America. Before the challenged prohibitions, the District’s murder rate was declining, and by 1976 had fallen to the 15th highest among the 50 largest American cities. . . . After the ban, the District’s murder rate fell below what it was in 1976 only one time. . . . In half of the post-ban years, the District was ranked the worst or the second-worst; in four years it was the fourth worst. . . .


The brief also quoted from a National Academies of Sciences meta-study that surveyed the social science literature on gun control. The National Academies decided that the evidence was not strong enough to support the hypothesis that gun control is beneficial, or the hypothesis that gun ownership is beneficial. Regarding the *New England Journal of Medicine* study of D.C., the National Academies concluded:

Thus, if Baltimore is used as a control group rather than the suburban areas surrounding DC, the conclusion that the handgun law lowered homicide and suicide rates does not hold. Britt et al. (1996) also found that extending the sample frame an additional two years (1968-1989) eliminated any measured impact of the handgun ban in the District of Columbia. Furthermore, Jones (1981) discusses a number of contemporaneous policy interventions that took place around the time of the Washington, DC, gun ban, which further call into question a causal interpretation of the results. In summary, the District of Columbia handgun ban yields no conclusive evidence with respect to the impact of such bans on crime and violence. The nature of the intervention—limited to a single city, nonexperimental, and accompanied by other changes that could also affect handgun homicide—make it a weak experimental design. Given the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications, it is difficult to draw any causal inferences.


In *Heller*, a collection of 24 professors conducted a new study of the D.C. ban, and reported the results in an amicus brief. Brief for Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). That study compared the post-ban changes in D.C. homicide rates to the rate in the other 49 largest cities, to Maryland and Virginia, and to the United States as a whole. The data showed that D.C. grew substantially worse in comparison to all of them. *Id.* at 7-10.

Two criminology professors, including David McDowall, who had been a co-author of the NEJM study, filed their own amicus brief. Brief for Professors of Criminal Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). That brief argued that post-ban increases in D.C. homicide were the result of a national trend caused by the spread of crack cocaine. *Id.* at 9-11.

Justice Breyer’s dissenting *Heller* opinion summarized the D.C. debate, and also the conflicting empirical evidence about gun ownership in general that had been offered by various amici. Because there was supporting evidence on each side, he concluded that the Court should defer to the D.C. City Council’s empirical judgment. Do you agree with his position that as long as there is *some* social science research that supports a particular gun control law, then courts should not rule the law unconstitutional? Or should courts try to evaluate the evidence on each side? Should they attempt to evaluate the evidence at all? Does it matter whether the original legislative body, such as the D.C. City Council, carefully considered empirical evidence before enacting the law? Although exceptions can be found, legislative fact-finding often consists of little more than a collection of talking points and factoids assembled by lobbyists for one side or the other. The legislator who has actually read a study that he or she cites is unusual—rarer even than legislators who read the full text of bills before voting on them.

### D. Sexual Orientation

People with unconventional sexual orientations have a variety of concerns about unequal treatment in our society and under the law. In the firearms context, that concern manifests as a special worry about violence rooted in bigotry.

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2. The hyperlinks go to versions of the articles on ResearchGate, JSTOR, and Academia.edu. None of these are public Internet, but your institution may have access. JSTOR is comprehensive for the journals it covers, whereas ResearchGate and Academia.edu depend on scholars to upload individual articles. JSTOR is available to anyone who will pay; ResearchGate is reasonably open to students; and Academia.edu is professors-only.
Pink Pistols is an unincorporated association established in 2000 to advocate on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (hereinafter LGBT) firearms owners, with specific emphasis on self-defense issues. There are 51 chapters in 33 states and 3 countries. Membership is open to any person, regardless of sexual orientation, who supports the rights of LGBT firearm owners. Pink Pistols is aware of the long history of hate crimes and violence directed at the LGBT community. More anti-gay hate crimes occur in the home than in any other location, and there are significant practical limitations on the ability of the police to protect individuals against such violence. Thus, the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in one’s home is of paramount importance to Pink Pistols and members of the LGBT community. . . .

ARGUMENT

I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT GUARANTEES LGBT INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS TO PROTECT THEMSELVES IN THEIR HOMES

Almost five years ago this Court held that the Due Process Clause protects the right of gay men and lesbians to engage in consensual sexual acts within the privacy of their own homes, “without intervention of the government.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). The exercise of that right, or even the non-sexual act of having a certain “appearance,” however, continues to put members of the LGBT community at risk of anti-gay hate violence and even death. Since Lawrence was decided, at least 58 members of the LGBT community have been murdered and thousands of others have been assaulted, many in their own homes (the most common site of anti-gay hate crimes), because of their sexual orientation. The question now presented is whether LGBT individuals have a right to keep firearms in their homes to protect themselves from such violence. Because LGBT individuals cannot count on the police to protect them from such violence, their safety depends upon this Court’s recognition of their right to possess firearms for self-protection in the home.

A. RECOGNITION OF AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IS LITERALLY A MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR MEMBERS OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY

The need for individual self-protection remains and is felt perhaps most pointedly by members of minority groups, such as the LGBT community. Minority and other marginalized groups are disproportionately targeted by violence, and have an enhanced need for personal protection. In 2005 alone, law enforcement agencies reported the occurrence of 7,163 hate crime incidents. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524125
Members of the LGBT community are frequent targets of such violence. Indeed, for the years 1995-2005, law enforcement agencies reported more than 13,000 incidents of hate violence resulting from sexual-orientation bias. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics (1995-2005). The individual stories of brutality underlying those statistics are horrific:

- On April 19, 2005, Adam Bishop was bludgeoned to death with a claw hammer in his home because he was gay. He was hit at least eighteen times in the head and then left face down in a bathtub with the shower running.
- On May 13, 1988, Claudia Brenner and Rebecca Wight were shot eight times—in the neck, the head and the back—and left for dead while hiking the Appalachian Trail, because they were lesbians. Rebecca died.
- On December 31, 1993, Brandon Teena, Lisa Lambert and Philip De Vine were murdered in a farmhouse in rural Richardson County, Nebraska in an act of anti-LGBT violence. Brandon and Lisa were both shot execution style, and Brandon was cut open with a knife.
- On the night of October 6-7, 1998, Matthew Shepard was pistol-whipped, tortured, tied to a fence in a remote area and left to die. He was discovered eighteen hours later, still tied to the fence and in a coma. Matthew suffered a fracture from the back of his head to the front of his right ear. He had severe brain stem damage and multiple lacerations on his head, face and neck. He died days later.
- On February 19, 1999, Billy Jack Gaither was set on fire after having his throat slit and being brutally beaten to death with an ax handle. In his initial police confession, Gaither’s murderer explained “I had to ’cause he was a faggot.”
- On November 19, 2006, Thalia Sandoval, a 27-year-old transgender Latina woman, was stabbed to death in her home in Antioch, California. The death was reported as a hate crime.

In fact, anti-gay violence is even more prevalent than the FBI statistics indicate. “Extensive empirical evidence shows that, for a number of reasons, anti-lesbian/gay violence is vastly under-reported and largely undocumented.” LAMBDA Services Anti-Violence Project (March 7, 1995) at ii. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that only 49% of violent crimes (rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault) are reported to the police. Many incidents of anti-lesbian/gay violence are not reported to police because victims fear secondary victimization, hostile police response, public disclosure of their sexual orientation, or physical abuse by police. Further, investigative bias and lack of police training also contribute to underreporting of anti-LGBT hate crimes. For these reasons, incidents of anti-gay violence reported by the FBI represent a small fraction of those reported to LGBT community antiviolence programs. During 1994, for example, “for every incident classified as anti-lesbian/gay by local law enforcement, community agencies classified 4.67 incidents as such.” Similarly, while the FBI reported only 26 anti-gay homicides in the ten-year period 1995-2005, the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs reported...
three times that number in half that time (78 anti-gay homicides in the five year period 2002-2006). See National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, Anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Violence (2003-2006). Studies have shown that approximately 25% of gay males have experienced an anti-gay physical assault. See From Hate Crimes to Human Rights: A Tribute to Matthew Shepard [Mary E. Swigorski et al. eds., 2001].

Hate crimes based on sexual orientation are the most violent bias crimes. See From Hate Crimes to Human Rights: A Tribute to Matthew Shepard, supra, at 2 (“Anti-LGBT crimes are characterized as the most violent bias crimes.”). See also LAMBD A Services Anti-Violence Project (March 7, 1995) at 20 (“The reported [anti-gay] homicides were marked by an extraordinary and horrific level of violence with 49, or 70%, involving “overkill,” including dismemberment, bodily and genital mutilation, multiple weapons, repeated blows from a blunt object, or numerous stab wounds.”); Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill, Hate Crimes: Confronting Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men 25 (Diane S. Foster ed., 1992) (“A striking feature . . . is their gruesome, often vicious nature.”).

Anti-gay hate crimes are also the most likely to involve multiple assailants. LAMBD A Services Anti-Violence Project (March 7, 1995) at 7 (“[A]nti-lesbian/gay offenses involve a higher number of offenders per incident than other forms of hate crime.”). In 1994 “[n]ationally, 38% of the incidents involved two or more perpetrators.” Id. “One-quarter involved between two and three offenders, and 12% involved four or more offenders. Nationally, there were at least 1.47 offenders for each victim.” Id.

While the District of Columbia’s gun laws preclude LGBT residents from possessing in their homes firearms that can be used for self-protection, see D.C. Code § 7-2507.02, the laws do not protect LGBT residents from gun violence. To the contrary, “when a weapon was involved [in an anti-gay attack] in the D.C. area, that weapon was three times more likely to be a gun” than elsewhere in the nation. Gay Men & Lesbians Opposing Violence, Anti-Gay Violence Climbs 2% in 1997. “Firearms accounted for 33% of all D.C.-area [anti-gay] assaults involving weapons, compared to 9% nationally.” Id.

Laws, such as D.C. Code § 7-2507.02, that prevent the use of firearms for self-protection in the home are of particular concern to members of the LGBT community, because historically hate crimes based on sexual-orientation bias have most commonly occurred in the home or residence. See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics, 2002 Edition (2003) at 7 (“Incidents associated with a sexual-orientation bias (1,244) most often took place at homes or residences—30.8 percent. . . .”); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics, 2003 Edition (2004) at 8 (“Incidents involving bias against a sexual orientation also occurred most often in homes or residences—30.3 percent of the 1,239 incidents reported in 2003.”); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics, 2001 Edition (2002) at 7 (“The data indicated that of the 1,393 hate crime incidents motivated by sexual-orientation bias, 33.4 percent of the incidents occurred at residences or homes.”); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics, 2005 Edition (2006) at Table 10 (reporting more anti-gay incidents in a home or residence than in any other location). Thus, members
of the LGBT community have an acute need for this Court to recognize their right to possess firearms to protect themselves from hate violence in their homes.

B. THE POLICE HAVE NO DUTY TO PROTECT AND DO NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT LGBT INDIVIDUALS FROM HATE VIOLENCE THAT OCCURS IN THEIR HOMES

Members of the LGBT community often must rely upon themselves for protection against hate violence in their homes. Police are seldom able to respond quickly enough to prevent in-home crimes. Worse, as this Court has held, the police have no mandatory legal duty to provide protection to individuals. See *Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales*, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61 (2005). To the contrary, police officers are granted discretion in determining when and where to exercise their authority:

> A well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.

> “In each and every state there are longstanding statutes that, by their terms, seem to preclude nonenforcement by the police. . . . However, for a number of reasons, including their legislative history, insufficient resources, and sheer physical impossibility, it has been recognized that such statutes cannot be interpreted literally. . . . [T]hey clearly do not mean that a police officer may not lawfully decline to. . . make an arrest. . . .”

> . . . It is, the [*Chicago v. Morales*, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)] Court proclaimed, simply “common sense that all police officers must use some discretion in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances.” . . .

Moreover, police have historically exercised their discretion in a manner that disfavored the protection of members of the LGBT community. See Lilian Faderman, Odd Girls Out and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth-Century America 194-95 (Richard D. Mohr, et al., eds. 1991). In fact, in 1997 the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs reported that, in anti-gay violence “[t]he number of reported offenders who were law enforcement officers increased by 76% nationally, from 266 in 1996 to 468 in 1997.” See *Gay Men & Lesbians Opposing Violence, Anti-Gay Violence Climbs 2% in 1997*. See also National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs, *Anti-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Violence in 1998* (April 6, 1999) at 24 (“[T]here were very dramatic increases in 1998 in reports of verbal and/or physical abuse by police in response to victim’s attempts to report a bias crime. . . . [O]ne in five victims of an anti-gay bias incident in 1998 who attempted to report it to police were treated to more of the same. Almost one in 14 became victims of actual (and in some cases, further) physical abuse.”). As a consequence, members of the LGBT community have a heightened need for this Court to recognize their individual right to possess firearms to protect themselves.

The triple-murder of Brandon Teena and two others in a rural farmhouse in 1993 starkly illustrates this need. Brandon, his girlfriend and a male friend were murdered in an anti-LGBT hate crime, after police failed
to arrest the two men who had previously kidnapped, raped and assaulted Brandon:

On December 31, 1993, John Lotter and Marvin Thomas Nissen murdered Brandon, Lisa Lambert and Philip De Vine in a farmhouse in rural Richardson County, Nebraska. These multiple murders occurred one week after Lotter and Nissen forcibly removed Brandon’s pants and made Lana Tisdel, whom Brandon had been dating since moving to Falls City from Lincoln three weeks earlier, look to prove that her boyfriend was “really a woman.” Later in the evening of this assault, Lotter and Nissen kidnapped, raped, and assaulted Brandon. Despite threats of reprisal should these crimes be reported, Brandon filed charges with the Falls City Police Department and the Richardson County Sheriff, however, Lotter and Nissen remained free. Lotter and Nissen have [since] both been convicted. . . .

Brandon, Lisa and Philip were home when their anti-gay attackers broke in and shot them execution-style. In D.C. they would have been prevented by law from possessing a firearm in the house that they could have used in self-defense to save their own lives. This Court should not adopt a reading of the Second Amendment that would leave LGBT individuals helpless targets for gay-bashers. See United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The right to defend oneself from a deadly attack is fundamental.”); United States v. Henry, 865 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1988) (same). . . .

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Do the concerns about hate crimes inevitably lead to the position advocated by the Pink Pistols? Do these episodes just as easily support arguments for strict gun control or gun prohibition? Which response promises to be more effective for those concerned about being victims of hate crimes? If, as the Pink Pistols argue, there is a natural-law right of self-defense (see Ch. 2.K, online Chs. 13 & 16), should it matter whether other people think the exercise of the right is wise or not?

2. Contrasting solutions. The Pink Pistols advocate a response to hate crimes that depends on individual initiative. For example, after the mass murder at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in June 2016, firearms trainers around the nation reached out to offer free training to LGBT persons. See David Kopel, The History of LGBT Gun-Rights Litigation, Wash. Post, June 17, 2016. Indeed, one of the original six plaintiffs in the Heller case was Tom Palmer, who when walking with a male friend one day in San Jose, California, had drawn a handgun to deter a large gang of would-be gay bashers. See Spencer S. Hsu, Self-Described “Peacenik” Challenged D.C. Gun Law and Won, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 2014; Tom G. Palmer, In Wake of Orlando, Gays Should Arm Themselves: Otherwise, in Gun-Free Zones Like the Pulse Nightclub, We’re Sitting Ducks to Maniacs and Terrorists, N.Y. Daily News, June 13, 2016. In contrast, other LGBT advocates argue that the response to hate crimes should be government-centric, based on tough criminal laws, gun control,
and education. For example, George Takei (famous for playing Lt. Sulu in the original Star Trek TV series, 1966-69) has founded the group **One Pulse for America**, to advocate for gun control. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each approach? Are the private and public responses incompatible? Is either response, standing alone, sufficient?

3. Now that *Heller* has taken gun prohibition off the table, what would be your policy advice to groups concerned about hate crimes against the LGBT community?

4. Some leading advocates of gun control have urged victims to eschew self-defense. Pete Shields, the chair of Handgun Control, Inc. (now known as Brady) advised: “[P]ut up no defense—give them what they want.” Pete Shields with John Greenya, *Guns Don’t Die—People Do* 125 (1981). This advice assumed that robbery was the main goal of physical attacks, but a similar approach has sometimes been used by victims of hate crimes. For example, in Czarist Russia, Jews developed a tradition of not resisting mob violence. They learned from experience that an anti-Jewish pogrom was likely to be a temporary outburst of fury rather than a systematic destruction of an entire community. If the Jews allowed the attackers to kill a few victims, the attackers would usually be appeased and would depart. The Jewish attitude began to change in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the pogroms grew worse. Is Shields’s advice helpful for victims of hate crimes?

5. Do the targets of hate crimes face different problems than people who are physically weak, such as the elderly, the disabled, or small-statured women?

6. The Pink Pistols brief also argued that the Second Amendment must be interpreted as an individual right of all Americans, rather than a right conditioned upon military service (the *Heller* dissenters’ view), because at the time *Heller* was decided, openly gay and lesbian citizens were not permitted to serve in the military. That policy was reversed in 2011. For a historical summary of United States military LGBT policy, see Naval Institute Staff, *Key Dates in U.S. Military LGBT Policy*, The Naval History Blog (Mar. 26, 2018). See also *infra* Part E.2 (discussing the federal gun prohibition for persons dishonorably discharged from the military and its effect on LGBT individuals). What other persons might be denied the right to keep and bear arms if *Heller* were reversed and the dissenting view is adopted?

7. For the argument that the Supreme Court’s gay-marriage decision in *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), means that traditional and long-standing state restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms are no longer justifiable (at least if the right to arms is considered as fundamental as the right to same-sex marriage), see Marc A. Greendorfer, *After Obergefell: Dignity for the Second Amendment*, 35 Miss. C. L. Rev. 128 (2016).
E. Categories of Prohibited Persons: Mental Illness, Marijuana, and the Military

1. Mental Illness

_Heller_ says it should not be read to “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill.” 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). Federal law prohibits anyone adjudicated as a “mental defective” or committed to a mental institution from possessing or purchasing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Social science is very clear that most persons suffering from mental illness do not pose a danger to themselves or to others. The science is equally clear that persons with mental illness are at greater risk of criminal victimization. Evidence is mixed about whether persons with mental illness, as a class, are more likely to commit crimes, and, if so, what other factors affect the likelihood. Schizophrenia is clearly associated with a higher risk of perpetrating homicide—although the vast majority of people suffering from schizophrenia are peaceable and nonviolent. See David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Reforming Mental Health Law to Protect Public Safety and Help the Severely Mentally Ill, 58 How. L.J. 715 (2015). See generally Clayton E. Cramer, My Brother Ron: A Personal and Social History of the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill (2012). Accordingly, a lifetime firearms ban based on an adjudication or commitment for mental illness may be overinclusive if the objective is to disarm people who are unusually dangerous.

The printed textbook excerpted _Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t_, 837 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Ch. 11.D.4). The facts in the case were clear: in 1986, a court had committed Mr. Tyler to a mental institution for up to 30 days, having found by clear and convincing evidence that he was mentally ill. He was successfully discharged; in 2011, he applied for a permit to buy a handgun and was denied. It was undisputed that Mr. Tyler was mentally healthy and had been so since 1986. It was also undisputed that Mr. Tyler was a prohibited person under the 1968 Gun Control Act, which covers anyone “who has been adjudicated has a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Mr. Tyler acknowledged that his due process rights had been respected at the committal hearing. The question before the Sixth Circuit was whether section 922(g)(4) could constitutionally operate as a lifetime ban for a person with a long-past mental illness.

The brief below addresses a different issue: whether a lifetime Second Amendment ban may be based on a short-term involuntary civil commitment with almost no due process, and no meaningful remedy for relief. In Pennsylvania, an emergency involuntary commitment for examination and treatment is allowed when a physician or state administrator has a reasonable belief that a person is severely mentally disabled and requires immediate treatment. The commitment can be effected without a formal hearing, court order, or judicial findings of fact. The commitment period may not exceed 120 hours. 50 P.S. § 7302.
arguable adverse collateral consequences befall an individual with a record of a Section 302 Commitment, including the permanent loss of Second Amendment rights. Fundamental precepts of due process require that individuals should have a full and fair opportunity to expunge their records where the evidence supporting their commitment was insufficient under Pennsylvania law.

ARGUMENT

I. A SECTION 302 COMMITMENT HAS PROFOUND DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS

A. AN INDIVIDUAL SUFFERS MANY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DUE TO A SECTION 302 COMMITMENT

The many severe and lasting consequences of a Section 302 Commitment include (but are by no means limited to) social stigma, reputational harm, diminished employment, permanent deprivation of certain civil rights, and loss of associational opportunities. If Petitioner and other individuals cannot obtain expungement of an improper Section 302 Commitment, they are faced with disclosing that involuntary commitment for most educational, employment, and associational opportunities for the remainder of their lives, subjecting them to a lifetime of discrimination, if not outright disqualification.

[The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has allowed redress of such reputational injuries from a mental health commitment (through the destruction of mental health records) only after a commitment has been found to be unlawful. Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1978). An individual cannot obtain relief from permanent collateral consequences without a full and adequate Section 302 Commitment expungement proceeding, which would allow her the opportunity to demonstrate the commitment was unlawful. Pennsylvania law provides no other avenue of relief.]

[A] Section 302 Commitment can be issued with as little as a brief evaluation of an individual by a physician — any physician — with minimal explanation or reasoning to support the commitment. None of the additional due process protections that attach in other deprivation of rights contexts are observed in a Section 302 Commitment.

Now the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an individual does not have the right to present evidence after a Section 302 Commitment that may impeach the certifying physician’s initial limited evaluation, which must be upheld if supported by a preponderance of the evidence before the physician at the time. This allows an improper Section 302 Commitment to persist as a permanent black mark upon an individual’s social standing and reputation,
significantly impacting educational, employment, and other associational opportunities. By unfairly constraining the only available post-deprivation remedy for an improper commitment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has denied Petitioner due process of law.

**B. THERE IS NO MEANINGFUL PRE-COMMITMENT PROCESS NOR ADEQUATE POST-COMMITMENT RELIEF FOR COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CAUSED BY A SECTION 302 COMMITMENT**

As demonstrated by Petitioner’s case, an individual is not provided even the most basic due process protections in advance of an involuntary temporary commitment under Section 302. Petitioner received no pre-deprivation notice of the potential consequences of the Section 302 Commitment; she received no right to review by a neutral arbiter; she received no opportunity to make an oral presentation; she was provided no means of presenting evidence; she received no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and respond to evidence; she received no right to counsel; she received no decision based upon a written record; and, perhaps most importantly, she received no pre-commitment review by a judicial officer. . . .

Even if the Commonwealth can satisfy this Court that exigent circumstances surrounding a Section 302 Commitment require denial of due process protections in advance of that commitment, the Commonwealth cannot justify the lack of adequate post-commitment relief. Petitioner’s case demonstrates that the post-deprivation remedies available are inadequate to meet the constitutionally required minimums when severe and permanent collateral consequences attach as a result of the commitment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s holding constrains the statutory expungement process to provide only a scant review of a Section 302 Commitment, with complete deference to the original fact-finding physician’s certification, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, and without the benefit of additional evidence. See Petition at p. 46. An individual seeking expungement of a Section 302 Commitment is left with only a dramatically one-sided and incomplete record upon which to dispute that the Commonwealth met its burden for a proper commitment.

Should the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court be allowed to stand, individuals like Petitioner will not be afforded an adequate post-deprivation remedy for an improper commitment.

**II. A SECTION 302 COMMITMENT PERMANENTLY DEPRIVES AN INDIVIDUAL FROM EXERCISING THE FUNDAMENTAL AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS GUARANTEED BY THE SECOND AMENDMENT**

**A. THE SECOND AMENDMENT ENSHRINED A FUNDAMENTAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS**

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) [Ch. 10.A], this Court confirmed that there was “no doubt, on the basis of both text and history,
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 595. The Second Amendment is incorporated through the substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and restricts state as well as federal government action. *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) [Ch. 10.B]. This Court has further declared that the rights protected by the Second Amendment are among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty. *See McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 778. The ability to keep and bear arms is a hallmark of uniquely American liberties.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cannot allow an individual liberty interest as important as the Second Amendment right to be cast aside without due process protections and expect to comport with this Court’s holdings in *Heller* and *McDonald*. This would be like holding that an individual who has been subjected to a Section 302 Commitment cannot exercise free speech, or cannot be protected against unreasonable search and seizure. This Court specifically rejected the invitation “to treat the right recognized in *Heller* as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees. . . .” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 780.

As it stands, the decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court significantly constrains Petitioner’s procedural rights at an expungement hearing . . . and will effectuate a permanent unconstitutional deprivation of her Second Amendment rights.

**B. A SECTION 302 COMMITMENT DEPRIVES AN INDIVIDUAL OF SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS**

A Section 302 Commitment immediately and permanently disqualifies an individual from keeping and bearing arms under Pennsylvania law in accordance with 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(c)(4), as well as under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determination that the only liberty interest affected by Petitioner’s Section 302 Commitment was the temporary suspension of her physical freedom is plainly wrong in the face of this Court’s holdings in both *Heller* and *McDonald*.

Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to consider that a Section 302 Commitment has the same drastic impact on Second Amendment rights as does an involuntary commitment for a much longer period, or even a felony conviction. And that, unlike a Section 302 Commitment, these other disqualifying events provide an individual significantly more due process protections before and after deprivation.

For example, involuntary commitments under 50 P.S. § 7303 (“Section 303 Commitment”) and 50 P.S. § 7304 (“Section 304 Commitment”) for periods of up to twenty or ninety days, respectively, require additional pre-commitment procedures that include a hearing and a right to counsel, and in the case of a Section 304 Commitment, the determination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 50 P.S. § 7304(f). *Amici Curiae* do not agree that the aforementioned procedures are sufficient to satisfy due process, but present them as evidence that additional procedures are feasible in advance of a permanent
deprivation of rights. Even though a Section 302 Commitment does not offer any such pre-deprivation protections, the consequential loss of Second Amendment rights for a Section 302 Commitment is the same as that under a Section 303 Commitment or a Section 304 Commitment. Pennsylvania law authorizes the immediate and permanent deprivation of an individual’s state firearms rights, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a) and (c), as well as reporting of the commitment to the federal government, which immediately and permanently deprives an individual of federal firearms rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The deprivation of Second Amendment rights also occurs upon a Section 303 or Section 304 Commitment, but only after a pre-commitment hearing involving additional due process protections.

Similarly, an individual who has been subjected to a Section 302 Commitment without such due process protections is subject to the same removal of firearms rights visited upon a convicted felon in accordance with Pennsylvania law, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a) and (c), and federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (g)(4). The critical difference, however, is that an individual convicted of a felony is afforded full due process protections before conviction and subsequent deprivation of Second Amendment rights. An individual committed under Section 302 is provided no meaningful pre-deprivation procedural protections.

Although there exists a mechanism for the ostensible restoration of firearms rights under state law, see 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(f)(1), this “remedy” is wholly insufficient to satisfy due process because it does not restore firearms rights under federal law. See In Re Keyes, 83 A.3d 1016, 1026-1027 (Pa. Super. 2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s constraints on an individual seeking expungement effectively eliminate any adequate post-deprivation remedy for the permanent loss of the right to keep and bear arms following a Section 302 Commitment.

A less grudging expungement process under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1(g) is necessary because it is the only available avenue to restore an individual’s Second Amendment rights that were forfeited without meaningful pre-deprivation due process protections, and for which no other adequate post-deprivation remedy exists. As the Petitioner demonstrates, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision reduces the expungement process to an illusory façade that does not provide an adequate remedy. . . .

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari without comment. 137 S. Ct. 2298 (2017).

2. Should the name of everyone receiving mental health treatment be entered into the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)? If not, what types of mental illness should disqualify a person from having firearms? Should the mentally ill be deprived of firearms even if they do not pose a danger to themselves or others? Who should determine whether a person’s mental illness is of the type or degree to keep them from possessing guns? For further examination of these issues, see Alyssa Dale O’Donnell,
3. The Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), prohibits anyone adjudicated as a “mental defective” or committed to a mental institution from possessing or purchasing firearms. Is this too stringent of a standard to protect the public from mentally dangerous persons with firearms? How would you rewrite the statute to provide more protection without depriving the non-dangerous mentally ill of their Second Amendment rights?

4. The scope of section 922(g)(4) is expansively interpreted by ATF regulation. According to this regulation, “adjudicated as a mental defective” means:

(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease:
   (1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
   (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.

(b) The term shall include —
   (1) A finding of insanity by a court in a criminal case; and
   (2) Those persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility pursuant to articles 50a and 72b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 850a, 876b.

27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

“Committed to a mental institution” means: “A formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority. The term includes a commitment to a mental institution involuntarily. The term includes commitment for mental defectiveness or mental illness. It also includes commitments for other reasons, such as for drug use. The term does not include a person in a mental institution for observation or a voluntary admission to a mental institution.” Id.

5. To what extent should persons with dementia or other forms of mental illness be prevented from owning firearms? The federal criminalization of gun ownership applies to anyone adjudicated as a “mental defective” or who has been committed to a mental institution; the provision does not cover an elderly person with a cognitive disorder who has never been legally declared incompetent or involuntarily institutionalized. As described in the amicus brief above, some medical care providers can impose a lifetime firearms prohibition on an individual by ordering a short-term involuntary committal. Should medical care providers be given greater power to criminalize individuals’ firearms possession? For further discussion, see Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the Second Amendment, 25 Elder L.J. 51 (2017) (arguing for voluntary surrender programs, and pointing out that “[m]any people with mild dementia can be responsible with firearms”); Abigail Forrester Jorandby, Armed and Dangerous at 80: The Second Amendment, The Elderly, and a Nation of Aging Firearm Owners, 29 J. Am.


7. Mandatory reporting. Several people called the FBI or a local sheriff’s office to warn authorities about the dangers of Nikolas Cruz, who later perpetrated a mass murder at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida. Official follow-up was effectively nil. See Andrew Pollack & Max Eden, *Why Meadow Died: The People and Policies That Created The Parkland Shooter and Endanger America’s Students* (2019); Richard A. Oppel Jr., Serge F. Kovaleski, Patricia Mazzei & Adam Goldman, *Tipster’s Warning to F.B.I. on Florida Shooting Suspect: ‘I Know He’s Going to Explode’*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2018. The county sheriff, whose office had numerous contacts with the criminal, was later removed for “neglect of duty and incompetence.” Anthony Man & Rafael Olmeda, *Gov. Ron DeSantis on Suspended Broward Sheriff: ‘Scott Israel Continues to Live in Denial’*, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 5, 2019. But there were also “[m]ore than 30 people [who] knew about disturbing behavior by Nikolas Cruz, including displaying guns, threatening to murder his mother and killing animals, but never reported it until after he committed the massacre at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School.” David Fleshler & Brittany Wallman, *More than 30 People Didn’t Report Disturbing Behavior by Nikolas Cruz Before Parkland Massacre*, South Florida Sun Sentinel, Nov. 13, 2018. Should reporting of such behavior be required by law?

8. Gun confiscation orders. Starting with Connecticut in 1999 and Indiana in 2005, several states have enacted laws to provide for the seizure of firearms from people who are deemed to be a risk to themselves or others. Somewhat similar confiscation orders have a longer record as a part of domestic relations laws. The new laws are sometimes called “extreme risk protection orders,” but that is a misnomer, because few such laws require a finding of an “extreme” risk. Another term is “red flag laws,” although some persons consider this term to be stigmatizing to the mentally ill. The laws may also be called “gun violence prevention orders.” The term “gun confiscation orders” is the most direct.
While laws vary, the general system is as follows: First, someone petitions a court for a temporary confiscation order. While Connecticut requires that the petitioners be either a state’s attorney, or two police officers, and requires that they must have investigated the situation, some other states allow petitions from a wide variety of people—ranging from close or distant relatives to someone who once had a dating relationship with the individual. The petitioner’s burden of proof at this ex parte hearing tends to be low. Some states require police to immediately confiscate all of an individual’s firearms and ammunition. Others allow for the guns to be surrendered to the custody of a federal firearms licensee (e.g., a gun store, or a lawyer with an FFL who stores guns for clients in some situations), or to some other responsible person.

Within a few weeks, there will be a further hearing, for which the respondent will have the opportunity to appear, to present evidence, and be represented by counsel at his own expense (or in Colorado, the option to have court-appointed counsel, whether or not indigent). At the hearing, the court will consider whether to extend the order for a longer period, such as 180 or 364 days. At the second hearing, the burden of proof for petitioner is usually “clear and convincing evidence.”

Some people would describe the system as consistent with President Trump’s statement “take the guns first, go through due process second.” Toluse Olorunnipa, Anna Edgerton & Greg Stohr, President Trump’s ‘Take the Guns First’ Remark Sparks Due Process Debate, Time, Mar. 3, 2018. Others disagree, pointing to recent laws that immunize accusers from cross-examination, by allowing them to submit an affidavit rather than testify in court. They argue that this is never due process.

Procedures vary widely for termination or expiration of orders, and for the return of firearms once an order is no longer in effect.

Because the laws are relatively new, social science research is limited. We do know that in Connecticut, 32 percent of ex parte orders are terminated at the two-party hearing. Michael A. Norko & Madelon Baranoski, Gun Control Legislation in Connecticut: Effects on Persons with Mental Illness, 6 Conn. L. Rev. 1609, 1619 (2014). The figure in Marion County, Indiana, is 29 percent. George F. Parker, Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm Seizure Law: Marion County, Indiana, 2006-2013, 33 Behav. Sci. & L. 308 (2015) (29 percent).

The only study to look at effects of gun seizure laws on crime rates found no statistically significant changes in “murder, suicide, the number of people killed in mass public shootings, robbery, aggravated assault, or burglary.” John R. Lott & Carlisle E. Moody, Do Red Flag Laws Save Lives or Reduce Crime? (Dec. 28, 2018) (covering Connecticut Indiana, Washington, and California, and also finding no effect on suicide). Another study reported: “Whereas Indiana demonstrated an aggregate decrease in suicides, Connecticut’s estimated reduction in firearm suicides was offset by increased nonfirearm suicides.” Aaron J. Kivisto & Peter Lee Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981-2015, 69 Psychiatric Serv. (June 1, 2018).

Another Connecticut study did not attempt to study suicide or crime rates but did contain many informative interviews with police officers and
other persons responsible for implementing the law. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs. 179 (2017). The study also produced an oft-quoted factoid: “[W]e estimated that approximately ten to twenty gun seizures were carried out for every averted suicide.” Id. at 206. However, the methodology behind the factoid was plainly erroneous. It assumed that every form of self-inflicted injury (e.g., a teenager cutting his arm) was a suicide attempt. Id. at 201, n.86. The factoid is valid only if one assumes that a teenager who injures herself by repeatedly banging her head against the wall has the same lethal intentions as an elderly man who puts a revolver in his mouth.

Confiscation orders have been upheld in two appellate cases. In Connecticut, the plaintiff was a pro se individual who “had brought to the [lower-court] hearing two electronic devices wrapped in tin foil.” Hope v. State, 163 Conn. App. 36, 40 (2016). The intermediate appellate court upheld the Connecticut statute against a Second Amendment challenge, because, at least for the particular plaintiff, the law “does not restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their homes.”

An Indiana decision upheld the statute against a challenge based on the Indiana Constitution right to arms, because Indiana precedent allowed prohibiting “dangerous” persons from having arms. Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. App. 2013). The court also rejected the argument that plaintiff was entitled to just compensation for the taking of his property. The court pointed out that the taking of dangerous property does not require compensation; for example, forfeiture laws allow uncompensated takings. Id. at 836-37. In 2015, Redington filed a petition for return of his 51 firearms. The hearing on the petition was held in January 2018. The State presented no evidence but instead asked the court to rely on the evidence from the 2012 hearing. The trial court denied the petition, but the intermediate appellate reversed, holding that “Redington met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not dangerous by presenting the testimony of a psychiatrist that he does not present a risk in the future because there is no evidence he has a propensity for violent or emotionally unstable conduct.” Redington v. State, 121 N.E.3d 1053, 1057 (Ind. App. 2019).

For further reading, see Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy, Guns, Public Health and Mental Illness: An Evidence-Based Approach for State Policy (2013) (addressing confiscation orders, short-term involuntary commitments, and other issues); U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action, Mar. 26, 2019; David B. Kopel, written testimony for Senate hearing.

2. Marijuana Users

Federal law prohibits the possession of a firearm by anyone “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Federal
law also makes it unlawful to sell a firearm to any person if the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such a person is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(3). Marijuana is a controlled substance under federal law. 21 U.S.C. § 812. In September 2011 the ATF issued an open letter to all federal firearms licensees stating that persons who use marijuana are prohibited persons under section 922(g)(3), regardless of whether state law authorizes such use for medicinal purposes. See ATF, Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees.

The Ninth Circuit in *Wilson v. Lynch*, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016), held that prohibiting purchase of a firearm by the holder of a state marijuana registry card does not violate the Second Amendment. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court concluded that it is reasonable to assume that a registry card-holder is much more likely to be a marijuana user than someone who does not hold a registry card and, in turn, is more likely to be involved with firearm violence. Similarly, in *United States v. Carter (Carter II)*, 750 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2014), the court held that the government had presented sufficient social science evidence to show that illegal drug users, including marijuana users, were more likely to be violent.

**NOTES & QUESTIONS**

1. Should persons whose diseases or disabilities are treatable with medical marijuana be forced to choose between treatment and their Second Amendment rights? See Michael K. Goswami, *Guns or Ganja: Pick One and Only One*, 52 Ark. Law. 24 (Spring 2017).


3. **Military Personnel and Veterans**

Surprisingly, persons who volunteer to serve in the United States armed forces subject themselves to certain risks of being forbidden to exercise Second Amendment arms rights.
a. **Lifetime Prohibition for Dishonorable Discharge**

One path to prohibition is to be dishonorably discharged from service. The Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits firearms and ammunition possession by anyone “who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(6). Neither in 1968 nor in the half-century thereafter has any empirical research been conducted on the prohibition.

As of December 31, 2018, there were 16,543 persons listed in the NICS database on the basis of a dishonorable discharge. FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Section, Active Records in the NICS Indices as of December 31, 2018. About 5,000 of these were added after the November 2017 mass murder at a church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, when it was discovered that the Air Force had failed to report the perpetrator’s dishonorable discharge to NICS. Sig Christenson, *After Killings, Pentagon Added Thousands of Dishonorable Discharge Cases to FBI Database*, San Antonio Express-News, Feb. 12, 2018.

Dishonorable discharges are imposed only after a general court martial. Except for desertion, the current reasons for dishonorable discharge overlap almost entirely with serious civilian felonies under state laws.

Only one federal circuit case has involved a serious challenge to the section 922(g)(6) prohibition. *United States v. Jimenez*, 895 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2018). The Second Circuit upheld the prohibition on Jimenez by analogizing his court martial convictions to civilian felony convictions: “those who, like Jimenez, have been found guilty of felony-equivalent conduct by a military tribunal are not among those ‘law-abiding and responsible’ persons whose interests in possessing firearms are at the Amendment’s core.” *Id.* at 235. “There is no reason to think that Jimenez is more likely to handle a gun responsibly just because his conviction for dealing drugs and stolen military equipment (including firearms) occurred in a military tribunal rather than in state or federal court.” *Id.* at 237.

In the past, homosexual behavior or orientation were grounds for military discharge. The typical practice was a “general” discharge for homosexual orientation, and an “undesirable” discharge for homosexual conduct. Earlier policies had sometimes imposed a dishonorable discharge for homosexual conduct. See Randy Shilts, *Conduct Unbecoming: Gays & Lesbians in the U.S. Military, Vietnam to the Persian Gulf* (1993). While less-than-honorable discharges can have major harmful effects on an individual’s civilian employability, they do not affect gun rights, for which only a dishonorable discharge triggers a prohibition. In 2011, the Obama administration announced that the approximately 100,000 homosexual persons who had been discharged were eligible to petition to have their discharge status upgraded to “honorable.” Dave Philipps, *Ousted as Gay, Aging Veterans Are Battling Again for Honorable Discharges*, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2015, at A1.

b. **Disarming the Armed Forces**

In early 1992, the Clinton administration finalized a regulation that had been initiated by the first Bush administration. It forbids gun possession by all
army and related civilian personnel at U.S. bases, except for military police. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dir. 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties 3 (Feb. 25, 1992). The directive was reissued by the Obama administration in 2011. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Dir. 5210.56, Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities 1 (Apr. 1, 2011). The directive was criticized for facilitating the mass murder by an Islamist extremist at the army base in Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009.

Many base regulations allow “privately-owned firearms” (POF) on-base only when registered and stored in a locked armory. For example, a soldier living in barracks could store her private rifle in an armory and check it out on a day off to go hunting. U.S. Dep’t of Army, III Corps & Fort Hood Reg., Commanding General’s Policy Letter #7 (Aug. 23, 2017).


Arms-bearing prohibitions for military personnel and civilian employees of the military were criticized for violating the Second Amendment and endangering safety. See, e.g., Major Justin S. Davis, The Unarmed Army: Evolving Second Amendment Rights and Today’s Military Member, 17 Tex. Tech Admin. L.J. 27 (2015). In response, a 2015 law required the Secretary of Defense to establish a process by which commanders “may authorize” armed forces members “to carry an appropriate firearm on the installation, center, or facility if the commander determines that carrying such a firearm is necessary as a personal- or force-protection measure.” National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2016, P.L. 114-92, 129 Stat. 726 § 526 (“Establishment of Process by Which Members of the Armed Forces May Carry an Appropriate Firearm on a Military Installation”). This partially overrode the 1992 Bush/Clinton and 2011 Obama Defense Directives, by allowing (but not requiring) commanders to authorize individual personnel to bear arms while on-base.

However, the Secretary of Defense failed to comply with the deadline to establish a system for authorized carry, and so the next year’s Defense appropriation partially withheld certain funding until the system was established. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2017, P.L. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 § 348 (“Limitation on Availability of Funds for Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence”). The funding threat was so effective that a few weeks before final passage of the appropriation bill, the Department

After fatal shootings in 2019 at the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii and the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida, the United States Marine Corps issued a new rule authorizing qualified law enforcement officers to bring privately-owned firearms on bases for personal protection. The authorized group includes military police, criminal investigators, and civilian police officers working at the bases. They must have concealed carry permits for the firearms.

c. Felonizing Gun Possession by Financially Incompetent Veterans

As discussed above, in Part E.1 Note 6, Congress repealed a Social Security Administration regulation that would have criminalized gun ownership by persons who were receiving disability benefits for a mental condition and who designated a personal representative to manage their relations with the Social Security Administration. The Veterans Administration (VA), however, goes much further in stripping Second Amendment rights of its beneficiaries.

The VA sometimes decides, on its own initiative, that a veteran beneficiary is financially incompetent, and so appoints a representative to manage the veteran’s benefits. This may be appropriate a variety of situations. For example, a veteran might have severe dementia. Or an elderly widow who formerly relied on her spouse to manage all financial affairs may not be able to navigate through the VA’s labyrinthine bureaucracy. Every time the VA appoints a personnel financial representative, the VA reports to NICS that the veteran has been adjudicated as a “mental defective.” As a result, if the veteran does not immediately dispose of all her firearms and ammunition, she is a prohibited person, and guilty of a federal felony. Financial incompetence is not in itself a mental illness, although it may sometimes be a consequence of such illness. The VA’s practices, and Congress’s torpor in reforming them, are criticized in Stacey-Rae Simcox, Depriving Our Veterans of Their Constitutional Rights: An Analysis of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Practice of Stripping Veterans of Their Second Amendment Rights and Our Nation’s Response, 2019 Utah L. Rev. 1.

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. When persons are in military service, their First Amendment rights may be subject to certain limitations, but they may not be extinguished. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (the “different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of [First Amendment] protections”); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding requirement petition circulators obtain permission of the base
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commander). Do First Amendment precedents provide useful analogies for the Second Amendment in a military context?

2. Almost all military personnel receive some training in how to kill. Personnel in combat specialties, such as infantry or artillery, receive extensive training in how to do so. In combat deployments, some do kill. Should public policy be especially vigilant in disarming persons who have shown a willingness to kill? Does the text of the Second Amendment offer any guidance?

3. Should a person who cannot balance a checkbook be allowed to own a firearm?

F. Indian Tribes

The printed textbook examined the arms culture of American Indians, and gun control laws aimed at Indians, focusing mainly on the original colonies and states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the textbook detailed, the distinctive American arms culture that we know today was a hybrid of the English and Indian arms cultures. Like states, Indian Nations have always been recognized as sovereigns within the American legal system—although, as with states, that sovereignty is not absolute, and may under some circumstances be overridden by the federal government.

At present, the Second Amendment is not applicable to Indian tribal nations. Self-governing Indian tribes have never formally enjoyed the protections of the Constitution. See *Tulton v. Mayes*, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). The *Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968* (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, extended certain constitutional rights to Indian tribes, including rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses; the right to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment was omitted. The protections of ICRA have been considerably weakened with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez*, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), which held that United States federal courts could not hear ICRA claims against Indian tribes except for habeas corpus petitions. The Court reasoned that such suits are barred by tribal sovereign immunity and that tribal courts are better equipped to decide civil rights complaints within tribal communities.

Within the jurisdiction of Indian land, gun rights and regulations are determined by tribal law. The following article excerpt describes some of these provisions.

3. Section 1304, pertaining to crimes of domestic violence, was added in 2013.
B. INDIAN NATIONS AND GUNS

The right of Indian tribes to make their own laws and be governed by them predates the formation of America. Such rights, linked to a tribe’s inherent sovereignty, have been recognized for centuries and are embodied in treaties, statutes, and case law. The anomalous position of Indian tribes within the federal system affords them the unique opportunity to self-govern in a localized manner in relation to guns. In the following subsections, I examine two areas where tribes have addressed the right to bear arms and guns more generally—in tribal constitutions and in tribal codes, respectively.

1. TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

Numerous tribes operate under written constitutions, which embody a wide range of tribal governance systems. Many of these constitutions reflect the particular historical context in which a tribe’s constitution was developed. They commonly set forth, much like the U.S. Constitution, separation of powers and protection of individual rights. Some tribal constitutions directly reflect ICRA’s influence, mirroring the individual-rights restrictions as seen in the federal statute.

In recent years, however, many tribes have undertaken constitutional reform, departing from the broadly implemented bureaucratic constitutions of the Indian Reorganization Act era.4 Because of a spate of recent tribal constitutional reform projects, some of these individual rights provisions have recently been drafted or modified. Today, a rather small but growing number of tribal constitutions expressly provide that the Indian nation may not infringe on the individual right to bear arms. Practically speaking, such provisions bind the tribal government to the stated protection and would, accordingly, limit the tribe’s ability to infringe the right, whether the suit is brought by an Indian or a non-Indian.

Of those tribes identified that have provisions securing the right to bear arms, some variation can be seen, as tribal constitutions reflect tribes’ particular circumstances, history, and tradition. Of particular note is that none included an analog to the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause regarding the formation of a militia. In contrast, in each tribal constitution dealing with the right to bear arms, the individual right is paramount. As such, these tribes convey a

4. [The Indian Reorganization Act was enacted in 1934 and was known as the “Indian New Deal.” The Act provided for greater tribal autonomy and self-government. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).—Eds.]
common respect for the individual right to bear arms as a limit on the actions of tribal governments.

Consider, for example, the current draft of the new Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe’s Constitution, which stipulates, “[t]he government of the Band shall not make or enforce any law or take any executive action . . . prohibiting the right of the People to keep and bear arms.” A similar clause is contained in the Constitution of the Zuni Pueblo:

Subject to the limitations prescribed by this constitution, all members of the Zuni Tribe shall have equal political rights and equal opportunities to share in tribal assets, and no member shall be denied freedom of conscience, speech, religion, association or assembly, nor shall he be denied the right to bear arms.

These can be contrasted with other tribes, whose constitutions are slightly more nuanced in the way the right is articulated. For example, the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ Constitution states, “[t]he Little River Band in exercising the powers of self-government shall not . . . [m]ake or enforce any law unreasonably infringing the right of tribal members to keep and bear arms.” The Constitution makes clear in its language that the right is not absolute but is subject to reasonable restriction. The Saint Regis Mohawk, likewise, include the clarification that the right to bear arms shall not be denied by the tribe “in exercising its powers of self-government” specifically.

. . .

Research reveals that most Indian tribes, in fact, do not expressly protect the right to bear arms in their constitutions.328 Thus, practically speaking, tribes’ extraconstitutional status means that those tribes that do not guarantee a right to bear arms are free to choose amongst a variety of gun control options. And even those that do contain an individual right guarantee will interpret their constitutional provisions according to tribal law and tradition, as they are not bound by federal law or federal court precedent. Accordingly, even if a tribe’s constitution directly mirrored that of the United States, the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment ruling—including, specifically, *Heller* and *McDonald*—would be inapplicable to tribal governments. Disputes over the scope of a right to bear arms in tribal court, then, could yield radically different results than similar cases adjudicated in the federal courts.

2. TRIBAL GUN LAWS IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Beyond constitutional guarantees, as seen in the following subsections, tribes may—and often do—regulate the ownership, possession, and use of guns in Indian country through both civil and criminal codes.

a. Criminal Codes. Perhaps not surprisingly, where tribes have criminal codes they almost always enumerate gun crimes. As previously explained, absent treaty provisions to the contrary, federal criminal laws of general applicability,
including gun laws, are in effect in Indian country as they are anywhere. And, in fact, there are federal laws that might affect firearm ownership and possession in Indian country, particularly as they pertain to domestic violence convictions. But where gaps or issues of nonenforcement arise, reservation Indians will look to tribal governments to define the scope of gun regulation. As explained previously, non-Indians are not subject to tribal criminal law.

Virtually every tribe researched that has a criminal code has enacted some type of gun law. Criminal laws regarding guns in Indian country, as a general matter, map onto those seen in states and municipalities around the country. Laws banning or governing the carrying of concealed weapons are quite prevalent. Several tribes allow concealed carry where a permit has been issued by the tribe. Some tribes more tightly constrain gun ownership in general, limiting the places where weapons may be lawfully carried with no permit exceptions.

Tribes’ most comprehensive gun laws are reflected in those pertaining to standard violent crimes. Because tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes by Indians and have exclusive jurisdiction over nonmajor crimes committed by Indians, tribal codes reflect the jurisdictional realities, with many codes omitting reference to crimes that would fall within the federal government’s jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act, such as murder. References to guns or weapons are most common in code provisions related to assault, robbery, intimidation, and stalking. Otherwise, tribal criminal codes are replete with gun restrictions, including laws governing ownership, carry, and use. Tribes such as the Fort Peck Assiniboine, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Oglala Sioux, the White Mountain Apache, the Chickasaw Nation, and numerous others, have comprehensive criminal gun laws.

Domestic violence, a notorious problem on Indian reservations, appears commonly in criminal codes as well, sometimes within the context of guns. Some tribes allow tribal police to take guns from the home in a domestic violence situation even if the gun was not used in the incident at issue. Others condition release of a defendant guilty of domestic violence on a guarantee of no future possession of firearms.

Tribes also employ carve outs to general gun regulations or prohibitions for activities that may be tribally distinct or connected to their particular cultural and ceremonial practices. The Navajo Nation code, for example, includes an express exception to its general gun laws where the firearm is used in “any traditional Navajo religious practice, ceremony, or service.” The San Ildefonso Pueblo Code similarly states an exception to its criminal gun code regarding “Negligent Use & Discharging of Firearms & Cannons” for those circumstances when such gun use is related to “any ceremony where traditions and customs are called for.” And the Shoshone and Arapaho of the Wind River Indian Reservation set forth requirements regarding the hunting of “big game” on the reservation. The code includes preceremony permitting requirements unique to those who will be dancing in the tribes’ Sundance Ceremony and using male elk or male deer in the ceremonies themselves.

Undoubtedly, the articulation of gun crimes is an essential tool for tribes in addressing public safety in Indian country and is, intuitively, at least one place where tribes may choose to legislate in regards to guns. At the most basic level, maintaining law and order, including imposing incarceration when necessary, is a key feature of sovereignty.
b. Civil Regulatory Codes. Numerous tribes have enacted comprehensive civil codes regarding guns. Unsurprisingly—given the rural nature of many reservations and the deep cultural links to a subsistence lifestyle many of these codes pertain to hunting and fishing. These codes typically set parameters for the taking of fish and game in ways similar to non-Indian country regulations. For example, such codes establish regulations regarding the types of guns that can be used in hunting, the maximum catch, and whether dogs can be used to aid in hunting. In some instances, they set forth exceptions to general criminal gun laws or articulate time, place, and manner restrictions. Such restrictions also address the use of firearms in demonstrations and regulations regarding the sale of guns on the reservation.

Other civil codes dealing with guns relate to restrictions in particular reservation locales, including casinos and tribal government buildings. Several address the issue of guns in and around schools. Curiously, some tribes also have in place regulations in the context of debtor-creditor law that guarantee debtors one firearm from being seized by a creditor. Others govern the transportation of guns, addressing such questions of how and when guns can, for example, be transported on a snowmobile, or whether a gun can be shot across a public highway or from the window of a moving vehicle.

There are also tribally specific rules embodied in the codes, with the use of bows and arrows commonly addressed along with guns. In some cases, tribes set forth specific requirements for acquiring Band hunting licenses (as distinct from Indian hunting licenses generally), particular regulations governing hunting and trapping on tribal lands, and codes distinguishing between commercial and cultural hunting.

NOTES & QUESTIONS

1. Should the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) be amended to include the right to keep and bear arms?

2. Indian citizenship. Based on conditions in 1787 and 1866, the text of the U.S. Constitution distinguished between Indians living in American society and those who lived among the sovereign Indian nations. Apportionment for the House of Representatives excluded “Indians not taxed,” since they were not part of the U.S. polity. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3; amend. XIV, § 2. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment declares: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The Supreme Court held that Section 1 did not confer citizenship on Indians born on tribal lands, even if they had left those lands; rather, they were citizens of their tribal nation. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884). But the Fourteenth

5. [Thirteen states also have laws providing for some protections for firearms in bankruptcy, usually with limits on the total number or the total value. See Carol A. Pettit & Vastine D. Platte, Exemptions for Firearms in Bankruptcy, Cong. Res. Svc. (Feb. 15, 2013).—Eds.]
Amendment is a floor, not a ceiling, on who may be a citizen; Congress may extend citizenship beyond the Fourteenth Amendment minimum. The 1887 General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) allocated certain Indian lands in severalty, in lots of 40, 80, or 160 acres. Indians who owned land were granted citizenship, but not voting rights. P.L. 49-119 (1887). Finally, all Indians were granted citizenship by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 (Snyder Act). P.L. 68-175 (1924) (“all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States”). Can a citizen be denied Second Amendment rights based on where she lives?

3. As Professor Riley explains elsewhere in her article, the legislative history of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act contains no explanation of why the Second Amendment was omitted. She finds the omission curious, given that 35 states had a constitutional right to arms, and in the previous decade, four states had amended their constitutions to regarding arms rights. Riley, supra, at 1704-10. Factors that might have contributed to the omission might include some of the same factors that led to the Gun Control Act of 1968: sharply rising violent crime in the previous several years; the rise of armed racial militant groups (most notably, the Black Panthers, but also including the American Indian Movement, which was founded in 1968); or the belief of some Congresspersons that the Second Amendment is not an individual right. Can you think of others?

4. Carrying firearms on tribal lands. A state-issued concealed handgun carry permit is not necessarily valid on tribal lands. For example, an Arizona permit is recognized by some tribes but not by others. Which Indian Tribes Recognize the Arizona Permit?, Arizona CCW Guide (Dec. 17, 2008). However, tribal courts have only limited authority to try non-Indians or Indians who are not resident on tribal land. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 425 U.S. 191 (1978).

5. Some tribes have procedures for issuing carry permits. Should such tribes consider entering into reciprocity agreements with other tribes and with states, so that a permit issued by the one could be used by travelers in the other’s territory? Most but not all states have a system for recognizing carry permits issued by other states. Recognition of an out-of-state permit may hinge on reciprocity (states A and B agree to recognize each other’s permits) or may be unilateral (the state simply recognizes all permits from other states, or all state permits that meet certain conditions). Should states recognize some or all Indian tribal carry permits? Should tribes do the same for state permits?

6. Violent crime against Indian women is very high, especially on Indian reservations and in tribal communities. For a discussion of this problem and how it might be addressed by expanding concealed carry laws in tribal jurisdictions, see Adam Crepelle, Concealed Carry to Reduce Sexual Violence Against American Indian Women, 26 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 236 (2017); Adam

7. *Treaties, agreements, and hunting rights.* Before 1873, U.S. government agreements with Indian nations were styled as “treaties,” requiring a two-thirds vote by the U.S. Senate for ratification, as with a treaty with a foreign nation. An 1871 statute forbade use of the treaty process. 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71). Since 1871, “agreements” have been the mode for federal-Indian relations, requiring a simple majority vote for approval by the U.S. House and Senate. (The House’s desire to get involved was a key motive for the 1871 act.) Although the 1871 statute might have been used to extinguish the validity of prior treaties, U.S. courts have been unwilling to cast aside the pre-1871 treaties; instead, they remain an important component of the rule of law by which the United States defines itself. Today, the United States government is the only nation in the world that has treaty relations with an interior citizen population. Since the 1960s, Indian litigants have often succeeded in asserting hunting or fishing rights that were guaranteed by treaties or agreements. See Francis Paul Prуча, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (1994); see also David B. Kopel, *The Right to Arms in Nineteenth Century Colorado*, 95 Denv. L. Rev. 329, 397 (2018) (Colorado Utes’ hunting rights under the 1873 Brunot Agreement).


**EXERCISE: SUBJECTIVITY IN FORMING POLICY VIEWS**

The special concerns of the communities surveyed in this Chapter have generated views and policy prescriptions on both sides of the gun question. The competing views seem to turn on different assessments of the risks and utilities of firearms. But underneath different views about the strength and persuasiveness of various items of empirical evidence there are also intuitions and values that may be impervious to empirical refutation. Ask three people you know the following questions, or some of them. Once you have collected the responses, compare and discuss the results with your classmates.

1. Do you think that private ownership of firearms in America imposes more costs than benefits or more benefits than costs? Or is the answer uncertain?
2. What is the basis for your assessment of the risks and utilities of private firearms?
3. How much of your assessment is based on an individual sense of your own capabilities and temperament?
4. How much of your assessment is based on your sense of the capabilities and temperament of other people?
5. How much of your assessment is based on data you have seen about the risks and utilities of firearms in the general population? See Ch. 1. What information specifically comes to mind?

6. How much of your assessment is based on having grown up in an environment where firearms were common or uncommon?

7. Approximately how many private firearms are there in the United States? See Ch. 1.A.


11. What percentage of firearms fatalities involve female victims? Female perpetrators? See supra Part B.

12. Roughly how many children (14 and under) are killed in firearms accidents each year? See Ch. 1.D.

EXERCISE: EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENTS, PERSONAL RISK ASSESSMENTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY

The gun debate often involves competing empirical claims about the costs and benefits of firearms. Consider how you use (or don’t use) empirical evidence in everyday choices such as whether and where to drive, bicycle, or walk; what you eat and drink; and so on.

Now assume that you are married with two children, ages 4 and 2. You live in a town bordering a large city in the Northeast. You commute into the city from the train station that is two blocks from your house. Your spouse cares for the children at home. In the last year, your neighborhood has experienced one incident of vandalism (a swastika sprayed on a garage door) and one daytime home invasion, which included an armed robbery. Your town is facing budget constraints and has cut its police force by 15 percent. Your spouse wants to purchase a handgun for protection. You are familiar with guns and have a bolt-action deer rifle, inherited from your grandfather, stored in the attic. You and your spouse are both lawyers and always make important decisions after robust debate. What factors will affect your decision to buy a handgun or not? Does your assessment change if you are a same-sex couple? If you are an interracial couple? If your spouse has a physical disability?

Plagued by complaints about a rising crime rate and emerging gang activity, the mayor of your town has assigned his staff to develop a policy response. The

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6. When you are asking the questions, don’t say “See Ch. 1.” We include the chapter cross-references for your convenience in seeing data on the above questions. If your respondents’ answers are wildly different from the actual data, then your respondents are quite typical.
mayor’s chief of staff suggests an ordinance banning the sale and possession of all semi-automatic handguns but allowing possession and sale of revolvers. A junior staffer suggests that the mayor establish free firearms training courses at mobile firing ranges set up around town. What factors should influence the mayor’s assessment of these proposals? What would you propose? What would you do as mayor?

Compare your decision making as mayor to your decision making as a spouse with a worried partner. Did you consider the same variables in each case? Did you weight them the same way? Is the decision making in the two contexts compatible? Incompatible? If the decision makers sincerely disagree, whose approach should be chosen?